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DON’T DISSOLVE THE “NERVE CENTER”: 
A STATUS-LINKED CITIZENSHIP TEST FOR 
PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS 
Abstract: 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires complete diversity among parties to invoke 
a federal court’s jurisdiction. The statute provides that a corporation is a citizen 
of its incorporating state and its principal place of business. In the 2010 case 
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the “nerve center” test as 
the exclusive test for determining a corporation’s principal place of business. 
Although the Court intended to adopt a simple standard, applying the rule to dis-
solved and inactive corporations remains complex. This Note argues for a status-
linked nerve center test. This approach is consistent with the text of § 1332 be-
cause it ensures that every corporation has a principal place of business under the 
dual citizenship requirements of the statute. In addition, a status-linked nerve 
center test is consistent with Hertz, as it creates a simple, predictable rule that re-
flects a corporation’s true center of control. Given the consistency with the stat-
ute and with Hertz, the status-linked nerve center rule is the best way to apply the 
nerve center test to atypical corporations. 
INTRODUCTION 
Consider an Internet-based corporation that sold clothing and conducts all 
of its sales activities online.1 Because this company was primarily an online 
retailer, it made some of its controlling business decisions at a small office in 
Boston—the corporation’s only office—and others by teleconference.2 Two 
and a half years ago, this corporation dissolved by filing a certification of dis-
solution with the State of Delaware, its state of incorporation.3 The corporation 
had failed to make a sufficient profit and its few stockholders unanimously 
voted to approve dissolution.4 Immediately after dissolving, the corporation 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See generally Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77 (2010) (referring to the problem of corpora-
tions that communicate over the Internet); John T. Mitchell, Home Is Where the Nerve Center Is: Lo-
cating a Corporation’s Principal Place of Business, GPSOLO, Oct./Nov. 2011, at 36, 37–38 (explain-
ing that it is common for corporations to conduct important business by teleconference). 
 2 See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 96; Mitchell, supra note 1, at 37–38. 
 3 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275(b) (2011). A corporation incorporated in Delaware can volun-
tarily dissolve by filing a certificate of dissolution with the Secretary of State. Id. 
 4 See id. § 275(a). To voluntarily dissolve, a corporation’s board of directors must adopt a resolu-
tion indicating that dissolution is advisable. Id. Then, a majority of the corporation’s stockholders 
must vote to approve the dissolution. Id. 
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broke the lease of its small office, as it could no longer afford to pay the rent.5 
The corporation’s officers then left Boston and went home to Philadelphia, 
where the former chief executive officer—from his apartment—paid and 
closed the corporation’s accounts and sold off its assets.6 
Two years and nine months after this corporation dissolved, the former 
landlord sues for the unpaid portion of the commercial lease.7 The landlord 
brings the action in a state court in Boston, but the corporation is concerned 
about out-of-state prejudice and seeks to remove the action to the U.S. District 
Court in Massachusetts.8 At this point, because this corporation dissolved near-
ly three years ago, any local ties that it had in Boston have dissipated.9 Moreo-
ver, this corporation did not have many local ties while it was active, as this 
corporation was an Internet-based company, and its activities were essentially 
invisible to the public.10 The corporation thus argues that there is complete di-
versity among the parties, as Delaware is its state of incorporation, and its 
“principal place of business” is Pennsylvania, where the officers are currently 
directing the closing of the business.11 The landlord, however, contends that 
there is not complete diversity among the parties, as the landlord is a citizen of 
                                                                                                                           
 5 See generally Chris Reidy, Boylston St. Is 7th Most Expensive for Office Rents, BOSTON.COM 
(Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.boston.com/business/news/2013/10/08/jones-lang-lasalle-survey-boylston-
seventh-most-expensive-street-for-office-rents/CeaD6LLvrNKyhPegK7RreM/story.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/37X6-SZ7X (indicating that Boston office rents are expensive relative to other places 
in the United States). 
 6 See generally DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 278 (2011) (providing that a corporation continues to 
exist for three years after dissolution for purposes of closing the business and conducting litigation). 
 7 See id. If litigation is initiated within three years of dissolution, a corporation will exist past the 
three-year statutory period for purposes of continuing the litigation. Id. 
 8 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)–(b) (2012). Removal to federal court in such a case would be based on 
the diversity of citizenship among the parties, as the landlord would bring a state-law claim. See id. 
 9 See Holston Invs., Inc. B.V.I., v. LanLogistics Corp., 677 F.3d 1068, 1071 (11th Cir.) (reasoning 
that, generally, an inactive corporation does not have a “lingering local presence”), cert. dismissed, 
133 S. Ct. 499 (2012); Grand Union Supermarkets of the V.I., Inc. v. H.E. Lockhart Mgmt., Inc., 316 
F.3d 408, 411 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that an inactive corporation “is in the same position as a foreign 
corporation in the eyes of the locality, and should therefore be given the same protection”). 
 10 Cf. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 96 (discussing a corporation that has its headquarters in New Jersey, but 
conducted all of its visible activities in New York); Michael E. Chaplin, Resolving the Principal Place 
of Business Conundrum: Adopting a Single Test for Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 30 REV. LITIG. 75, 
96–97 (2010) (discussing the Hertz Court hypothetical and referring to this as the “hidden control” 
problem). 
 11 Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), (c)(1) (2012) (indicating that a corporation is a citizen of its state of 
incorporation and its principal place of business); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, LanLogistics 
Corp. v. Holston Invs., Inc. B.V.I., No. 12-366 (U.S. Sept. 21, 2012) [hereinafter LanLogistics Peti-
tion] (arguing that the post-dissolution principal place of business should be the state in which the 
corporation is winding up its affairs); see also Athena Auto., Inc. v. DiGregorio, 166 F.3d 288, 292 
(4th Cir. 1999) (suggesting that, upon dissolution, a corporation’s principal place of business could be 
the place from which the corporation was pursuing litigation). 
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Massachusetts and the dissolved corporation’s principal place of business 
should be considered the state in which it last conducted business: Massachu-
setts.12 
The issue posed by this hypothetical is difficult because once a corpora-
tion dissolves or becomes inactive, determining its principal place of business 
becomes a more complex question.13 Since the financial crisis of 2008, busi-
ness failure and dissolution has been the unfortunate fate of many corporations 
and financial institutions.14 When a corporation dissolves or becomes inactive, 
it ceases its normal business and thus no longer has a principal place of busi-
ness in the colloquial sense of the term.15 Because such a corporation continues 
to legally exist, however, this change in active status raises important questions 
about whether the change impacts its jurisdictional citizenship.16  
Diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 requires each party on one 
side of a controversy to be citizens of different states than those on the other 
side.17 Section 1332(c) indicates that a corporation is a citizen of its incorporat-
                                                                                                                           
 12 Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), (c)(1); Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., 
Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 141 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that a corporation has its principal place of business in 
the state of its last business transaction); see also Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 291 (concluding that a 
corporation might continue to conduct activity sufficient to retain a principal place of business after 
dissolution). 
 13 Cf. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92, 94–95 (adopting the nerve center test for determining a corporation’s 
principal place of business, but not indicating how to apply this test to dissolved and inactive corpora-
tions); The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Leading Cases, 124 HARV. L. REV. 309, 318 (2010) [hereinaf-
ter Leading Cases] (predicting that courts will “struggle to develop a coherent common law doctrine 
in those ‘hard cases’ where novel fact patterns arise”). 
 14 See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS––BUSINESS AND NON-
BUSINESS CASES COMMENCED, BY CHAPTER OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 12-MONTH 
PERIOD ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2012 tbl.F-2 (n.d.), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2012/1212_f2.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
RB2R-C2T7 (indicating that there were 27,274 Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings in the United States be-
tween December 2011 and December 2012); Failed Bank List, FDIC, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/
individual/failed/banklist.html, archived at http://perma.cc/47GK-HTYE (last updated Mar. 10, 2014) 
(listing the banks that have failed since October 1, 2000 and showing a substantial increase in closings 
in 2008 and 2009). 
 15 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 278 (2011) (indicating that a dissolved corporation does not con-
tinue to exist for the purpose for which it was organized); Chaplin, supra note 10, at 85 n.53 (“If a 
corporation is inactive, it has no brain, and therefore, no nerve center.”); Timothy J. Yuncker, Inactive 
Corporations and Diversity Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c): The Search for a Principal Place 
of Business, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 815, 815–16 (1997) (explaining that once a corporation no longer 
conducts business, it does not have a principal place of business). 
 16 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 278; infra notes 101–111 and accompanying text (discussing the 
effect of dissolution and inactivity under state corporate law). 
 17 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2012); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996) (citing Straw-
bridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806)); see also infra notes 31–47 and accompanying 
text (explaining subject matter jurisdiction in greater detail). 
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ing state and its principal place of business.18 Establishing a uniform test to 
determine the principal place of business has been complicated by the variety 
of corporate structures and activities.19 As a result, in the 2010 case Hertz 
Corp. v. Friend, the U.S. Supreme Court provided guidance on this question by 
adopting a uniform test for all corporations.20 The Hertz Court held that a cor-
poration’s principal place of business is its “nerve center” —i.e., its “center of 
direction, control, and coordination.”21 
This Note argues for a status-linked nerve center test for determining a 
corporation’s principal place of business.22 Despite the Court’s adoption of the 
nerve center test in Hertz, applying this test to atypical corporate structures and 
activities remains problematic.23 The finding of a status-linked nerve center 
will ensure that every corporation has a principal place of business and thus 
meets the dual corporate citizenship requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.24 In 
addition, because a corporation’s nerve center will be linked to its active status, 
this nerve center will reflect the actual center of control at the time of the liti-
gation.25 Finally, this approach is both simple to apply and generates predicta-
ble jurisdictional results.26 
Part I explains diversity jurisdiction, the principal place of business tests 
that existed prior to Hertz, and the Court’s attempt to simplify this scheme.27 
Part II examines the problem of determining the principal place of business of 
dissolved and inactive corporations and the circuit split that developed in this 
                                                                                                                           
 18 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). 
 19 See, e.g., Ferrell v. Express Check Advance of SC LLC, 591 F.3d 698, 706 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that the “place of operations” test should be applied when a corporation’s physical operations 
are located in one state); Peterson v. Cooley, 142 F.3d 181, 184 (4th Cir. 1998) (applying the nerve 
center test to a holding company that is not geographically bound). 
 20 559 U.S. at 92–93. The Supreme Court adopted the nerve center test to the exclusion of other 
activity-based tests that had previously been applied. Id. at 93. 
 21 Id. at 92–93. 
 22 See infra notes 235–290 and accompanying text. 
 23 Compare Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92–93 (holding that a corporation’s principal place of business is 
its “center of direction, control, and coordination”), with Holston, 677 F.3d at 1070–71 (analyzing 
whether a dissolved corporation has a principal place of business and concluding that Hertz is merely 
relevant, but not controlling, for dissolved corporations), Chaplin, supra note 10, at 85 n.53 (arguing 
that an inactive corporation has “no nerve center”), and Yuncker, supra note 15, at 815–16 (explaining 
that a dissolved corporation does not have a principal place of business). Moreover, the Hertz Court 
itself indicated the potential for difficult applications of the nerve center test, specifically acknowledg-
ing that some corporations “divide their command and coordinating functions.” See 559 U.S. at 94–
95.  
 24 See infra notes 255–269 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 270–281 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 282–290 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 31–85 and accompanying text. 
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context prior to Hertz.28 Part III assesses the effect of the Hertz Court’s adop-
tion of the nerve center test and the three potential approaches that remain after 
Hertz regarding the citizenship of dissolved and inactive corporations.29 Final-
ly, Part IV argues that the nerve center of a corporation should be directly 
linked to its active status and that the citizenship of dissolved and inactive cor-
porations should thus be the location from which litigation and wind up activi-
ties are conducted.30 
I. DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE PRINCIPAL  
PLACE OF BUSINESS ANALYSIS 
The U.S. Constitution extends the judicial power “to controversies . . . be-
tween Citizens of different States.”31 Rather than automatically extend this 
power to federal district courts, the Constitution instead authorizes Congress to 
grant judicial power to the “inferior Courts” that it establishes.32 To have the 
power to adjudicate, a federal court must have both personal jurisdiction over 
all of the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the type of case that it is 
hearing.33 Generally, a federal court will have subject matter jurisdiction pur-
suant to a “federal question” or if there is complete “diversity of citizenship” 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See infra notes 86–145 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 146–234 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 235–290 and accompanying text. “Winding up” a corporation’s affairs involves 
paying and closing corporate accounts and liquidating (selling) corporate assets. BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY 1738 (9th ed. 2009). 
 31 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. In addition, the Constitution extends the judicial power “to all 
cases, in law and equity, arising under . . . the Laws of the United States.” Id. This has been articulated 
as “federal question” jurisdiction. See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153–54 
(1908). 
 32 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; see Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922) (explaining 
that, with the exception of the Supreme Court, “[e]very other court . . . derives its jurisdiction wholly 
from the authority of Congress”). Because the Constitution limits the power of federal courts, Con-
gress may not extend the power it grants to federal district courts beyond the scope of Article III. See 
Kline, 260 U.S. at 234; 13F CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 3522 (3d ed. 2009); see also Dustin M. Dow, Note, The Unambiguous Supremacy 
Clause, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1009, 1017 (2012) (explaining that a federal court's jurisdictional power is 
constrained by both Article III and federal statutes). 
 33 See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945) (holding that personal jurisdic-
tion can exist based on a party’s contacts with the forum state if those contacts are sufficient to satisfy 
due process of law); Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1867) (ruling that a court without 
subject matter jurisdiction over a case lacks power to hear that case), superseded by statute, Customs 
Courts Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, sec. 510, § 1919, 94 Stat. 1727, 1743 (current version at 28 
U.S.C. § 1919 (2012)), as recognized in Johns-Manville Corp. v. United States, 893 F.2d 324, 326 
(Fed. Cir. 1989). 
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among the parties and a minimum amount in controversy.34 A court must im-
mediately dismiss or remand a case if it determines, at any time, that it lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction.35 
In 28 U.S.C. § 1332, Congress defined and limited federal district courts’ 
original jurisdiction over “all civil actions” between “citizens of different 
States.”36 Diversity jurisdiction under § 1332 requires all parties on one side of 
a controversy to be citizens of different states than those on the other side.37 
This requirement reflects the purpose of diversity jurisdiction, which aims to 
provide a neutral federal forum for out-of-state parties who might experience 
prejudice in state courts.38 Unlike an individual, who is only a citizen of the 
state of domicile, a corporation, under § 1332, is a citizen of both its incorpo-
rating state and its principal place of business.39 This definitional difference 
reflects the reality that a corporation may have a presence sufficient to render it 
a “citizen” in more than one state.40 
The previous rule that equated a corporation’s citizenship with only its 
state of incorporation created the possibility of a corporation invoking an un-
deserved federal forum.41 For instance, by incorporating in a different state, a 
corporation could attain a federal forum in a state where in which it had a local 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (federal question jurisdiction); id. § 1332(diversity jurisdiction); 
Michael G. Collins, Jurisdictional Exceptionalism, 93 VA L. REV. 1829, 1830–32 (2007). Currently, 
diversity jurisdiction requires a minimum of $75,000 in controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Note that a 
federal court may also have jurisdiction in limited circumstances other than federal question and di-
versity cases, such as admiralty cases. See Collins, supra, at 1854–55. 
 35 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3); Cooper, 73 U.S. at 252. 
 36 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
 37 See id. § 1332(a)(1); Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 68 (citing Strawbridge, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 267). 
 38 S. REP. NO. 1830, at 4 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101–02; see also 13F 
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 32, § 3601 (explaining that diversity jurisdiction was established in 
response to the concern about out-of-state parties facing prejudice in state courts and noting that the 
origins of this concern are unclear). 
 39 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Although a corporation—under the statute—is a citizen of “every” 
state in which it is incorporated, it can only have one principal place of business. See id. 
 40 See S. REP. NO. 1830, at 4 (explaining that § 1332 was amended to add principal place of busi-
ness citizenship in response to the illogic previously resulting from allowing a corporation to obtain a 
federal forum in the state in which it had its principal place of business). 
 41 See id.; 13F WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 32, § 3601. Originally, a corporation was not a 
citizen at all, but instead was a “mere legal entity” whose jurisdiction depended on the citizenship of 
“the individuals who compose[d] the corporation.” See Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 
61, 86, 91–92 (1809), overruled in part by Louisville, Cincinnati, & Charleston R.R. Co. v. Letson, 43 
U.S. (2 How.) 497 (1844), superseded by statute, Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 
18 Stat. 470, 470–71 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012)). 
2014] Principal Place of Business for Dissolved and Inactive Corporations 647 
presence.42 This tool allowed a corporation to manipulate the system to create 
complete diversity.43 
This potential for abuse gave rise to a need to expand corporate citizen-
ship to multiple states.44 In 1958, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 1332 by add-
ing § 1332(c), which provided that a corporation is a citizen of its incorporat-
ing state and of “the State where it has its principal place of business.”45 The 
amendment responded to the illogic of allowing a corporation engaged in local 
business to attain a federal forum merely by reincorporating in a different 
state.46 By creating dual citizenship for corporations, the amendment reflected 
the reality that a corporation is unlikely to suffer out-of-state prejudice if it has 
its principal place of business in that state.47 
Although the amendment to § 1332 attempted to adopt an easily admin-
istrable definition for a corporation’s principal place of business, applying the 
amended statute proved to be difficult in practice.48 Specifically, courts disa-
greed about the location in which a corporation would be least likely to suffer 
prejudice in state courts.49 This Part explains courts’ diverse attempts to define 
principal place of business and the Supreme Court’s attempt to clarify this is-
sue in Hertz.50 First, Section A outlines the various complex principal place of 
business tests that courts utilized prior to Hertz.51 Then, Section B discusses 
                                                                                                                           
 42 See S. REP. NO. 1830, at 4. 
 43 See id.; cf. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 
276 U.S. 518, 524 (1928) (declining to inquire into motives for reincorporation so long as diversity of 
jurisdiction exists), superseded by statute, Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, sec. 2, § 1332, 72 
Stat. 415, 415 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332). 
 44 See S. REP. NO. 1830, at 4–5 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101–02; 13F 
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 32, § 3624. 
 45 See sec. 2, § 1332, 72 Stat. at 415 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)). Recently, Congress 
further amended § 1332(c)(1) to indicate that a corporation is a citizen of “every state” in which it has 
incorporated and of “the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.” Federal Courts 
Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-63, sec. 102, § 1332(c)(1), 125 Stat. 
758, 758–59 (emphasis added) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)). 
 46 See S. REP. NO. 1830, at 4. This inherent unfairness was further exacerbated by the fact that 
incorporation is a “legal device [that is] not available to the individual citizen.” Id. 
 47 13F WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 32, § 3624. Notably, if a corporation has its principal place 
of business in its incorporating state, the corporation is only a citizen of one state. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(c) (2012). 
 48 13F WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 32, § 3625; see Hertz, 559 U.S. at 88 (explaining that 
decisions under the Bankruptcy Act disagreed about how to determine a corporation’s principal place 
of business and thus concluded that this phrase failed to guide federal courts in the context of diversity 
jurisdiction). 
 49 13F WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 32, § 3625; see infra notes 53–70 and accompanying text 
(discussing the various federal appeals court approaches prior to Hertz). 
 50 See infra notes 53–85 and accompanying text. 
 51 See infra notes 53–70 and accompanying text. 
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the nerve center test that the Hertz Court adopted in an attempt to simplify the 
principal place of business analysis.52 
A. The Complex Principal Place of Business Scheme 
Prior to Hertz, federal courts used a variety of complex multifactor tests 
to determine a corporation’s principal place of business.53 Generally, courts 
utilized the “center of corporate activity” test,54 the “nerve center” test,55 or a 
facts and circumstances-based “total activity” test that incorporated elements 
of the other two approaches.56 With the exception of the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit, most federal appeals courts did not apply one of these 
tests to the exclusion of the other.57 Rather, most courts analyzed a corpora-
tion’s structure and activities and applied the test that seemed best suited to 
carry out the purposes of diversity jurisdiction in the particular case.58 The goal 
was to apply the test that would locate the state in which a corporation would 
be least likely to experience prejudice in state court.59 
                                                                                                                           
 52 See infra notes 71–85 and accompanying text. 
 53 15 J. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 102.54[3][a] (3d ed. 2012); see infra 
notes 54–56 (collecting cases). 
 54 See Grand Union, 316 F.3d at 411. This test was sometimes referred to as the “place of opera-
tions” or the “corporate operations” test. See Ferrell, 591 F.3d at 706; Tosco v. Cmtys. for a Better 
Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated by Hertz, 559 U.S. 77; Neat-N-Tidy Co. v. Trade-
power (Holdings) Ltd., 777 F. Supp. 1153, 1156 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). In the First Circuit, this approach 
collapsed into the “locus of the operations” test as both tests focused on the location of a corporation’s 
actual operations and assets. See Díaz-Rodríguez v. Pep Boys Corp., 410 F.3d 56, 59–60 (1st Cir. 
2005), abrogated by Hertz, 559 U.S. 77. 
 55 See, e.g., Peterson, 142 F.3d at 184–85; Topp v. CompAir, Inc., 814 F.2d 830, 834, 838 (1st Cir. 
1987); Wis. Knife Works v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1282–83 (7th Cir. 1986); Scot Type-
writer Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862, 864–65 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
 56 See, e.g., MacGinnitie v. Hobbs Grp., LLC, 420 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2005); Teal Energy 
USA, Inc. v. GT, Inc., 369 F.3d 873, 876 (5th Cir. 2004); Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Russellville Steel 
Co., 367 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Hertz, 559 U.S. 77; Gadlin v. Sybron Int’l Corp., 
222 F.3d 797, 799 (10th Cir. 2000); Gafford v. Gen. Electric Co., 997 F.2d 150, 162–63 (6th Cir. 
1993), abrogated by Hertz, 559 U.S. 77. 
 57 See, e.g., Ferrell, 591 F.3d at 706 (explaining that either the nerve center test or the place of 
operations test should be applied based on the circumstances); Peterson, 142 F.3d at 184 (same). The 
Seventh Circuit applied the nerve center test in all circumstances, explaining that jurisdiction should 
be simple and determinable. See Wis. Knife, 781 F.2d at 1282–83. 
 58 See, e.g., Ferrell, 591 F.3d at 706 (choosing to apply the place of operations test because the 
corporation in the case had a physical presence within the state); Peterson, 142 F.3d at 184 (explaining 
that, when a corporation is not “geographically bound,” the court will apply the nerve center test ra-
ther than the place of operations test); Indus. Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1094 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (applying the place of operations test, rather than the nerve center test, because the corpora-
tion’s local contact mitigated against prejudice concerns in state court). 
 59 See Peterson, 142 F.3d at 184; Indus. Tectonics, 912 F.2d at 1094. 
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The center of corporate activity test associated the principal place of 
business with the physical location of a corporation’s assets and day-to-day 
operations.60 Courts would typically apply this test if operations were relative-
ly centralized in one or a few states rather than “far-flung” or spread evenly 
across multiple states.61 If operations occurred in a few states, the principal 
place of business was identified as the state where operations substantially 
predominated.62 By applying the center of corporate activity test to corpora-
tions with centralized physical operations, courts assumed that this type of 
corporation would be least likely to suffer outsider prejudice in the state where 
its activities were most visible to the public.63 
Rather than focus on corporate assets and operations, the nerve center test 
equated “the corporation’s brain,” typically its headquarters, with its principal 
place of business.64 In 1959, in Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York articulated this test, 
defining the nerve center as the location “from which its officers direct, control 
and coordinate” activities “in the furtherance of the corporate objective.”65 
Many courts applied this test only if activities were “far-flung” across many 
states, if assets could be easily relocated, if the corporation lacked any physical 
operations, or if it had a complex structure.66 These courts reasoned that the 
nerve center test should apply when the center of corporate activity test failed 
to identify the state in which the corporation was least likely to suffer prejudice 
in state courts.67 
Other courts, in an effort to align the principal place of business with the 
nature of corporate activities and organizational structure, applied a third total 
activity test to assess “the totality of the corporate existence.”68 Federal ap-
                                                                                                                           
 60 See, e.g., Ferrell, 591 F.3d at 706; Díaz-Rodríguez, 410 F.3d at 59; Grand Union, 316 F.3d at 
411. 
 61 See, e.g., Díaz-Rodríguez, 410 F.3d at 61; Tosco, 236 F.3d at 497. 
 62 Davis v. HSBC Bank Nev., N.A., 557 F.3d 1026, 1028–29 (9th Cir. 2009); Tosco, 236 F.3d at 
497. 
 63 See Díaz-Rodríguez, 410 F.3d at 61; Indus. Tectonics, 912 F.2d at 1094. 
 64 Wis. Knife, 781 F.2d at 1282 (stating that the court “look[s] for the corporation’s brain”); see 
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Cammon, 929 F.2d 1220, 1223 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating that the nerve 
center is a corporation’s “executive headquarters”); see also Topp, 814 F.2d at 834 (explaining that the 
nerve center test focuses on the place where corporate activities are “controlled and directed”); Scot 
Typewriter, 170 F. Supp. at 865 (defining the nerve center as the place where corporate officers “di-
rect, control and coordinate all activities”).  
 65 170 F. Supp. at 865. 
 66 See, e.g., Peterson, 142 F.3d at 184–85; Topp, 814 F.2d at 834; Scot Typewriter, 170 F. Supp. at 
865. 
 67 See Peterson, 142 F.3d at 184–85; Topp, 814 F.2d at 834.  
 68 See, e.g., MacGinnitie, 420 F.3d at 1239; Teal Energy, 369 F.3d at 876, 879; Capitol Indem., 
367 F.3d at 836. 
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peals courts applying this test reasoned that it achieved a needed flexibility to 
account for differing activities and structures.69 There was disagreement 
among these courts, however, regarding how to practically implement the to-
tality test.70 
B. Hertz and the Nerve Center Test for Principal Place of Business 
Although these complex tests reflected an attempt to carry out the pur-
pose of diversity jurisdiction, it was at the expense of uniformity, predictabil-
ity, and administrative simplicity.71 Given the variety of fact-specific principal 
place of business tests and the intra-circuit variations found with each ap-
proach, these tests were criticized for producing inconsistent results.72 Specifi-
cally, scholars observed that corporate citizenship determinations were com-
pletely unpredictable because the each test focused on different factors.73 A 
single corporation could be deemed a citizen of three different states depend-
ing on the test applied, a phenomenon that could lead plaintiffs to file claims in 
courts where they would receive a favorable jurisdiction determination.74 More-
                                                                                                                           
 69 See Teal Energy, 369 F.3d at 876, 879; Capitol Indem., 367 F.3d at 836. 
 70 See, e.g., MacGinnitie, 420 F.3d at 1239; Teal Energy, 369 F.3d at 876; Capitol Indem., 367 
F.3d at 836. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits considered all of the facts 
and circumstances in light of the corporation’s nerve center and “place of activities” to determine 
which of these focal points should be given more significance in each case. See MacGinnitie, 420 F.3d 
at 1239; Teal Energy, 369 F.3d at 876. The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth 
Circuits applied a more ad hoc totality test that considered a corporation’s character, purpose, type of 
business, and place of operations. See Capitol Indem., 367 F.3d at 836; Gadlin, 222 F.3d at 799; Gaf-
ford, 997 F.2d at 162–63. 
 71 See Hertz, 55 U.S. at 92 (explaining the drawbacks of these complex tests). 
 72 See Chaplin, supra note 10, at 77–78 (characterizing the pre-Hertz state of the law as uncer-
tain); Lindsey D. Saunders, Note, Determining a Corporation’s Principal Place of Business: A Uni-
form Approach to Diversity Jurisdiction, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1475, 1486 (2006) (observing that there is 
a “lack of uniformity” among the various federal appeals court approaches). Compare Indus. Tecton-
ics, 912 F.2d at 1091, 1094 (concluding that even if the headquarters is in a different state, the princi-
pal place of business is the state in which a majority of corporate activities occur), with Wis. Knife, 
781 F.2d at 1282 (declining to look to the location of corporate assets or employees and concluding 
that the principal place of business would generally be in the state in which the headquarters is locat-
ed). 
 73 See Chaplin, supra note 10, at 77 (explaining that the pre-Hertz tests were “malleable”); Con-
nor D. Deverell, Casenote, Defining a Corporation’s “Principal Place of Business”: The United States 
Supreme Court’s Decision in Hertz v. Friend, 56 LOY. L. REV. 733, 745, 774 (2010) (observing that the 
various tests, which emphasized different factors, produced inconsistent results). Compare Díaz-
Rodríguez, 410 F.3d at 59 (reasoning that the location of the corporation’s retail stores was most sig-
nificant), with Wis. Knife, 781 F.2d at 1282 (holding that the location of the headquarters was most 
significant). 
 74 See Deverell, supra note 73, at 754 (implying that, prior to Hertz, a corporation’s citizenship 
was unclear because it could differ in each of the federal appeals courts); Saunders, supra note 72, at 
1475 (observing that “[n]onuniformity encourages forum shopping” to have the benefit of the most 
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over, because these tests required the courts to assess the relevant facts and 
circumstances to locate a corporation’s principal place of business, subject 
matter jurisdiction was criticized as a burdensome, time-consuming process.75 
Acknowledging the concerns about unpredictability, the Supreme Court 
in Hertz expressly adopted the nerve center test for determining a corporation’s 
principal place of business to the exclusion of the various multifactor ap-
proaches used by most federal courts.76 The Hertz Court premised its nerve 
center test on two main grounds.77 First, the Court reasoned that the text of 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) suggests the recognition of a “prominent” place found in a 
single, determinable location within a state.78 The Court explained that a cor-
poration’s prominent location is typically in the state of its headquarters, rather 
than in the state with the highest volume of business activity.79 
                                                                                                                           
favorable corporate citizenship test); see also Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92 (explaining that different circuits 
apply the various tests in different ways). Compare Metro. Life Ins., 929 F.2d at 1223 (concluding that 
the principal place of business is in the state where the corporation’s principal offices are located), 
with Neat-N-Tidy, 777 F. Supp. at 1156 (reasoning that the location of a corporation’s principal offices 
would not necessarily be its principal place of business). 
 75 See Chaplin, supra note 10, at 87 (“Flexibility is, by nature, time-consuming.”); Deverell, su-
pra note 73, at 748 (noting that it was time consuming for courts to apply multifactor approaches); see 
also Teal Energy, 369 F.3d at 876–82 (using six pages to explain its principal place of business analy-
sis); cf. Wis. Knife, 781 F.2d at 1282 (“We prefer the simpler test. Jurisdiction ought to be readily de-
terminable.”). 
 76 See 559 U.S. at 92–93. The Court considered the principal place of business issue under cir-
cumstances that did not clearly invoke either the nerve center test or the center of corporate activity 
test, as Hertz Corporation’s physical operations were conducted in many states without any obvious 
centralization. See id. at 81–82, 89. On the one hand, because Hertz conducted business in 44 states, 
its activities were “far-flung” over many states and, thus, the nerve center test would have been the 
most appropriate. See id. at 82; see also Friend v. Hertz Corp., No. C–07–5222 MMC, 2008 WL 
7071465, at *3 (N.D.C.A. Jan. 15, 2008) (noting Hertz’s argument that its activities were “spread 
among many states” (internal quotation marks omitted)), vacated, 375 F. App’x 757, 757 (9th Cir. 
2010). Alternatively, given that the volume of Hertz’s activity was greatest in California, the center of 
corporate activity test could have arguably been applied. See Friend v. Hertz Corp., 297 F. App’x 690, 
691 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that the district court correctly applied the “place of operations” test), 
vacated, 559 U.S. 77; see also Hertz, 559 U.S. at 81 (noting that California accounted for $811 million 
of Hertz’s $4.371 billion in annual revenue). 
 77 See 559 U.S. at 93. 
 78 Id. This interpretation is highlighted by the statute’s reference to the fact that a corporation is 
deemed a citizen of “every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated[,]” but only of 
“the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) 
(2012) (emphasis added). 
 79 Hertz, 559 U.S. at 93. The Court noted that applying the corporate activities test instead would 
frequently locate a national corporation’s principal place of business in California, as California’s 
population is significantly larger than that of other states. Id. at 94. 
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Second, the Court emphasized the importance of a simple rule that pro-
duces a predictable result.80 The Court reasoned that a simple jurisdictional test 
is more efficient and cost-effective for courts.81 According to the Hertz Court, 
this is particularly true in the subject matter jurisdiction context, as a federal 
court has an obligation to ensure that jurisdiction is proper before considering 
the merits of a case.82 Further, the Court reasoned that corporations benefit 
from a more uniform and predictable citizenship approach, as jurisdictional 
predictability allows for more effective business planning.83 
Finally, the Hertz Court acknowledged that the nerve center test would oc-
casionally fail to locate the state in which out-of-state prejudice was least like-
ly.84 Nevertheless, the Court stressed that the need for a uniform, predictable 
principal place of business analysis outweighed this inevitable consequence.85 
II. DEFINING CITIZENSHIP: THE PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS PROBLEM 
FOR DISSOLVED AND INACTIVE CORPORATIONS 
The variety of corporate structures and activities exacerbates the difficul-
ties inherent in both defining principal place of business under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(c)(1) and applying the nerve center test.86 In many cases, determining 
the location of a corporation’s direction and control is not obvious.87 As corpo-
                                                                                                                           
 80 Id. at 94. The Court reasoned that it is easier to determine the location of a corporate headquar-
ters under the nerve center test than it is to assess the volume of activity within various states. Id. The 
Court noted, however, that ease of administration should not come at the expense of locating the 
“place of actual direction, control, and coordination,” and that courts should not locate a nerve center 
in a place that is merely “a mail drop box” or “a bare office with a computer.” Id. at 97. 
 81 Id. at 94. 
 82 See id.; see also Wis. Knife, 781 F.2d at 1282 (“The first thing a federal judge should do . . . is 
check to see that federal jurisdiction is properly alleged.”). 
 83 Hertz, 559 U.S. at 94–95. 
 84 See id. at 96 (explaining that “seeming anomalies” are a necessary consequence in light of the 
“benefits that accompany a more uniform legal system”). The Court noted that, for example, if most 
of a corporation’s visible activities are in one state, but its headquarters is in another state, out-of-state 
prejudice might be less likely in the state where its activities are more visible rather than in the loca-
tion of its headquarters. Id. 
 85 See id. 
 86 See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96 (2010) (observing that the principal place of busi-
ness is less clear when a corporation’s headquarters is located in one state but its most visible activi-
ties occur in a different state); see also Chaplin, supra note 10, at 95 (explaining that, for large corpo-
rations, it is unclear if the nerve center test requires that courts “balance the importance of the various 
command structures”); Mitchell, supra note 1, at 37–38 (observing that it is often difficult to locate 
the physical location of management’s decisions, particularly when a corporation’s meetings occur by 
teleconference). 
 87 See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 96 (observing that the nerve center test does not “automatically generate 
a result”); see also Chaplin, supra note 10, at 95 (arguing that the nerve center is not obvious when 
control activities are decentralized); Mitchell, supra note 1, at 38 (illustrating the practical difficulties 
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rations continue to conduct more of their business over the Internet, for exam-
ple, there may be multiple locations—rather than a single physical headquar-
ters—where a corporation is directed and controlled.88 The nerve center is sim-
ilarly difficult to identify if a corporation does not have a headquarters after 
dissolving or becoming inactive.89 Indeed, when a corporation is dissolved or 
inactive, its center of control may change to accommodate the officers’ activi-
ties in directing and controlling the corporation.90 
Moreover, when defining the principal place of business of a corporation 
that lacks a physical headquarters, the state in which out-of-state prejudice is 
least likely is often unclear.91 By amending 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to include the 
principal place of business requirement, Congress aimed to deem a corporation 
a citizen of the location where it was least likely to suffer prejudice in state 
courts.92 Accordingly, the nerve center test, by focusing on the center of con-
trol, generally aims to locate the place where a corporation is least likely to 
suffer such prejudice.93 For a dissolved or inactive corporation, however, a 
change in the center of control may subject the corporation to out-of-state 
                                                                                                                           
when applying the nerve center test, noting that it is often unclear where key decisions are physically 
made). 
 88 See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 95–96 (recognizing the possibility that, using the Internet, “corporations 
may divide their command and coordinating functions”); see also Mitchell, supra note 1, at 38 (ob-
serving that executives are often located in multiple states rather than a single state). 
 89 See Chaplin, supra note 10, at 83, 99 (indicating that because an inactive corporation’s princi-
pal place of business is unclear, the results of the nerve center test in this context are also uncertain); 
Dawn Levy, Note, Where Do Dead Corporations Live?: Determining the Citizenship of Inactive Cor-
porations for Diversity Jurisdiction Purposes, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 663, 671, 674 (1996) (observing 
that it is unclear whether an inactive corporation has a principal place of business and that the tradi-
tional indicia of corporate citizenship do not exist in this context). 
 90 See Mamco Corp. v. Carlisle Cos., No. 10-C-0124, 2011 WL 13646, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 4, 
2011) (holding that a corporation in the process of dissolving has its principal place of business where 
its wind up activities are conducted); see also Yuncker, supra note 15, at 830 n.103 (implying that, 
arguably, a corporation’s nerve center could change from the location of its headquarters to the loca-
tion of its post-dissolution wind up activities). 
 91 See Yuncker, supra note 15, at 830 (explaining that a corporation that has been inactive for only 
a short period of time will not be subject to out-of-state prejudice); Levy, supra note 89, at 687–88 
(arguing that a local corporation is still local after becoming inactive and, thus, will not be subject to 
out-of-state prejudice). Compare Athena Auto., Inc. v. DiGregorio, 166 F.3d 288, 291–92 (4th Cir. 
1999) (explaining that an inactive corporation could have a “continuing impact . . . sufficient to give it 
a geographical identity there”), with Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 
933 F.2d 131, 141 (2d Cir. 1991) (concluding that the principal place of business is the location of the 
corporation’s last business transaction, as this is the state where it retains a local character). 
 92 S. REP. NO. 1830, at 4 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101–02; see 13F 
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 32, § 3601. 
 93 See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 96 (implying that in most cases a corporation’s nerve center will be the 
location where prejudice is least likely, although the test “may in some cases produce results that seem 
to cut against the basic rationale” for diversity jurisdiction). 
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prejudice in a state where it originally had its headquarters, as there is conse-
quently less of a local presence in that state.94 The appropriate location of such 
a corporation’s nerve center is thus not obvious.95 
As a result, although the Supreme Court in the 2010 Hertz Corp. v. Friend 
decision provided some clarity by articulating the nerve center test, determin-
ing a corporation’s principal place of business remains problematic for unor-
thodox corporations.96 The Hertz Court recognized the possibility of “hard 
cases” where a corporation’s principal place of business might not be the state 
where out-of-state prejudice is least likely, but provided little guidance regard-
ing the location of the nerve center in these contexts.97  
This Part explores the difficulties inherent in determining the principal 
place of business of dissolved and inactive corporations.98 Section A discusses 
the nature of dissolved and inactive corporations under corporate law princi-
ples.99 Then, Section B explores the pre-Hertz circuit split that developed re-
garding the citizenship of these corporations.100 
                                                                                                                           
 94 See Grand Union Supermarkets of the V.I., Inc. v. H.E. Lockhart Mgmt., Inc., 316 F.3d 408, 
411 (3d Cir. 2003) (concluding that an inactive corporation does not have a principal place of business 
as it does not have a business presence and is thus a “foreign corporation in the eyes of the locality”); 
Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 291 (indicating that a corporation remains a citizen of the state where it was 
previously active only to the extent that it continues to have an impact there). 
 95 Compare Holston Invs., Inc. B.V.I. v. LanLogistics Corp., 677 F.3d 1068, 1071 (11th Cir.) 
(concluding that a dissolved corporation does not have a principal place of business), cert. dismissed, 
133 S. Ct. 499 (2012), with Yuncker, supra note 15, at 834–35 (arguing that an inactive corporation 
should retain its last principal place of business for 180 days after becoming inactive), and Levy, su-
pra note 89, at 684 (arguing that an inactive corporation’s principal place of business should be the 
location of its last principal place of business while it was active). 
 96 Compare Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92, 95 (holding that the principal place of business is a corpora-
tion’s nerve center, while recognizing the potential for “hard cases”), and City of Syracuse v. Loomis 
Armored U.S., LLC, No. 5:11–cv–00744, 2011 WL 6318370, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2011) (ruling 
that an inactive corporation’s principal place of business is the location in which it last conducted 
business), with Holston, 677 F.3d at 1071 (holding that the nerve center test did not apply to a dis-
solved corporation that had withdrawn from business, reasoning that the corporation did not have a 
principal place of business), Chaplin, supra note 10, at 85 n.53 (arguing that an inactive corporation 
has “no nerve center”), and Yuncker, supra note 15, at 815–16 (explaining that a dissolved corporation 
does not have a principal place of business). 
 97 See 559 U.S. at 95–96. Significantly, the Court noted that the nerve center test would not “au-
tomatically generate a result” under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). Id. This lack of guidance is complicated 
by the circuit split that had developed in this context prior to Hertz. See infra notes 112–145 and ac-
companying text. 
 98 See infra notes 101–145 and accompanying text. 
 99 See infra notes 101–111 and accompanying text. 
 100 See infra notes 112–145 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Nature of Dissolved and Inactive Corporations 
As a threshold matter, inactivity and dissolution are not coextensive.101 A 
corporation is inactive if it does not conduct any business activities.102 Inactivi-
ty occurs, among other ways, when a corporation ceases activity.103 Unlike a 
dissolved corporation, an inactive corporation that merely ceases business con-
tinues to exist for purposes of continuing its business.104 
In contrast, dissolution is governed by statute and requires an affirmative 
act.105 The requisite act can occur by a corporation’s voluntary dissolution, 
court order, or state administrative action.106 Upon dissolution, state corporate 
law statutes provide that a dissolved corporation is not completely “dead” and 
authorize the corporation to continue to exist as a legal entity for a specified 
period.107 A dissolved corporation continues to exist to liquidate its business 
and assets, and to prosecute and defend lawsuits.108 Directors are generally 
permitted to remain in office as agents of the corporation for the limited pur-
poses of liquidating business and winding up the corporation’s affairs until the 
statutory period expires.109 In most states, the corporation’s power to wind up 
its business includes the capacity to sue and be sued as a separate legal enti-
                                                                                                                           
 101 16A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS 
§ 7991 (2012); see Cal. Labor Sch., Inc. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 332 F.2d 393, 394 (D.C. 
Cir. 1963) (“[A] cessation of business activity is not the equivalent of a corporate dissolution.”). 
 102 16A FLETCHER, supra note 101, §§ 7989, 7991, 7995. 
 103 Id. § 7991. A corporation is also considered inactive, but not necessarily dissolved, if it fails to 
commence business or if all of its assets or shares are acquired. Id. §§ 7989, 7995; see also Park Ter-
race, Inc. v. Phx. Indem. Co., 91 S.E.2d 584, 586 (Ariz. 1956) (holding that a corporation is inactive, 
but continues to exist, when all of its stock is acquired by one person). 
 104 See 16A FLETCHER, supra note 101, § 7991; see also Old Colony Trust Co. v. Third Univer-
salist Soc’y of Cambridge, 188 N.E. 711, 149 (Mass. 1934) (explaining that a corporation continues to 
exist despite transferring all of its assets because the corporation did not take any formal steps to dis-
solve); Greenwood v. Estes, 504 P.2d 206, 210 (Kan. 1972) (holding that a corporation does not “au-
tomatically forfeit its charter” when it does not engage in activities). 
 105 16A FLETCHER, supra note 101, § 7986; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275(a) (2011) 
(indicating that dissolution generally requires both a resolution adopted by the board of directors and a 
vote by a majority of the stockholders entitled to vote); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 156D, § 14.02(b), (e) 
(2012) (requiring that to voluntarily dissolve a corporation, the board of directors must submit a pro-
posal to the shareholders and a majority of the shareholders entitled to vote must approve). At com-
mon law, dissolution was equated with termination of corporate existence. 16A FLETCHER, supra note 
101, § 7966. 
 106 16A FLETCHER, supra note 101, § 7986. 
 107 See id. § 7966. Delaware General Corporate Law indicates that a dissolved corporation con-
tinues to exist for three years after dissolution. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 278 (2011). Other states have 
similar statutes in place. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.80 (2012) (continuing existence for five 
years); N.Y. BUS. CORP. § 1006 (McKinney 2012) (continuing corporate existence for certain activi-
ties without any express time limitation). 
 108 16A FLETCHER, supra note 101, § 7966. 
 109 See id. §§ 8142, 8144.40, 8158. 
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ty.110 A dissolved corporation, however, does not continue to exist in order to 
carry on the business that it conducted prior to dissolution.111 
B. The Principal Place of Business Problem: Dissolved and Inactive 
Corporations Prior to Hertz 
When articulating in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) that a corporation is a citizen 
of both its incorporating states and its principal place of business, Congress did 
not expressly indicate whether these are conjunctive requirements.112 General-
ly, jurisdictional rules are strictly construed to limit the circumstances under 
which diversity jurisdiction can be invoked.113 Although the use of conjunctive 
“and” in a statute generally indicates that all requirements must be met, articu-
lated requirements may be read as disjunctive alternatives if doing so is more 
consistent with context and congressional intent.114 A court is unlikely to inter-
pret “and” as disjunctive, however, unless a conjunctive reading of the statute 
                                                                                                                           
 110 Id. § 8142; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 278 (“All corporations . . . shall nevertheless be 
continued . . . for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits . . . .”); 805 ILL COMP. STAT. 
5/12.30(a)(5) (2012) (same); N.Y. BUS. CORP. § 1006(a)(4) (same). 
 111 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 278; see also 805 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/12.30(a) (“[A] dissolved corpo-
ration shall not thereafter carry on any business except that necessary to wind up . . . .”); N.Y. BUS. 
CORP. § 1006(a) (indicating that a dissolved corporation only continues to exist to wind up the corpo-
ration’s affairs). 
 112 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012). Congress’s use of the word “and” in § 1332(c)(1) does not 
necessarily indicate intent for the requirements to be conjunctive. See Slodov v. United States, 436 
U.S. 238, 247 (1978) (analyzing congressional intent even though “and” appeared in a federal tax 
statute); see also Reese Bros., Inc. v. United States, 447 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2006) (observing that 
the word “and” is not always used conjunctively). Interpreting a statute as establishing disjunctive 
alternative requirements is sometimes more consistent with the context of the statute. See Slodov, 436 
U.S. at 247, 251. 
 113 See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1941), superseded by statute 
on other grounds, Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 1441, 62 Stat. 937, 937–38 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012)), as recognized in Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of Brevard, Inc., 
538 U.S. 691, 697 (2003); Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 1983); 
see also Levy, supra note 89, at 684 (arguing that where diversity jurisdiction is unclear, the presump-
tion should weigh against a finding of federal jurisdiction). Jurisdictional rules are strictly construed to 
ensure that federal jurisdiction does not encroach on the independence of the states. Shamrock, 313 
U.S. at 108–09. 
 114 Compare Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 58 (1930) (holding that “and” is ordinarily con-
junctive when utilized in a statute), Johnson v. Advance Am., 549 F.3d 932, 935 (4th Cir. 2008) (ana-
lyzing § 1332(c)(1) and concluding that the “statute’s use of the conjunctive gives dual, not alterna-
tive, citizenship”), Reese Bros., 447 F.3d at 235–36 (“The usual meaning of the word ‘and’ . . . is con-
junctive . . . .”), and 1A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 21:14 (6th 
ed. 2006) (“Statutory phrases separated by the word ‘and’ are usually interpreted in the conjunctive.”), 
with OfficeMax, Inc. v. United States, 428 F.3d 583, 589 (6th Cir. 2005) (explaining that “and” can be 
interpreted as disjunctive if it is more consistent with congressional intent).  
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is irrational.115 Consequently, courts have disagreed about whether there might 
be circumstances when, based on either the context or congressional intent, a 
particular type of corporation is a citizen of only its incorporating state.116  
Applying § 1332(c)(1) prior to Hertz, courts established three main ap-
proaches to determine the principal place of business of dissolved and inactive 
corporations.117 Rather than apply one of the complex principal place of busi-
ness tests that were utilized for active corporations, the courts frequently ap-
plied a distinct inquiry.118  
1. Last Business Transaction Approach: Principal Place of Business as a 
Prerequisite for Diversity Jurisdiction 
The “last business transaction” approach established in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit required that an existing corporation, even a 
dissolved or an inactive one, retain dual citizenship.119 This approach interprets 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) as establishing the state of incorporation and principal 
place of business as two conjunctive requirements for each diversity jurisdic-
tion inquiry.120 In this circuit, a dissolved or inactive corporation is deemed a 
citizen of the place that it last transacted business while it was active or, alter-
natively, the place in which it last had its principal place of business.121 
                                                                                                                           
 115 See Slodov, 436 U.S. at 246–47; Crooks, 282 U.S. at 55; OfficeMax, 428 F.3d at 589 (observ-
ing that courts only interpret “and” as disjunctive “to avoid an incoherent reading of a statute”); see 
also Sosa v. Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 348 F.3d 979, 981, 983 (11th Cir. 2003) (concluding that 
“and” should be interpreted disjunctively to prevent “irrational results”). 
 116 Compare Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. Hansen, 48 F.3d 693, 698 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that Con-
gress did not intend for courts to “strain to locate a principal place of business when no such place in 
reality exists”), with Comtec, Inc. v. Nat’l Tech. Sch., 711 F. Supp. 522, 525 (D. Ariz. 1989) (conclud-
ing that “and” indicates congressional intent “for all of the requirements of the statute to be fulfilled”). 
 117 See 15 MOORE ET AL., supra note 53, § 102.56[3]; infra notes 119–145 and accompanying text 
(discussing these pre-Hertz approaches in detail). 
 118 See, e.g., Wm. Passalacqua, 933 F.2d at 141 (assessing the place of the corporation’s last busi-
ness transaction without mentioning any of the principal place of business tests); SEG Vanguard Gen. 
Corp. v. Ji, 195 F. Supp. 2d 564, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing the principal place of business tests 
only after first determining that SEG Vanguard was an active corporation). 
 119 Pinnacle Consultants, Ltd. v. Leucadia Nat’l Corp., 101 F.3d 900, 907 (2d Cir. 1996). Addi-
tionally, although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has not yet expressly addressed this 
issue, a district court within the Ninth Circuit deemed a dissolved or inactive corporation a citizen of 
the place where it last had a principal place of business. See China Basin Props., Ltd. v. One Pass, 
Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1038, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 1993). 
 120 Circle Indus. USA, Inc. v. Parke Constr. Grp., Inc., 183 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1999); China 
Basin, 812 F. Supp. at 1040 (explaining that § 1332 requires a finding of “the corporation’s place of 
incorporation and its principal place of business”). 
 121 Wm. Passalacqua, 933 F.2d at 141; China Basin, 812 F. Supp. at 1040. Often, but not always, 
these two places are the same. See Wm. Passalacqua, 933 F.2d at 141. The Second Circuit reasoned 
that a corporation’s citizenship is not altered by conducting a lawsuit or continuing to receive mail, as 
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This rule reflects the reality that a dissolved or inactive corporation might 
still retain a local character.122 Thus, eliminating the principal place of business 
citizenship requirement would provide these corporations with an undeserved 
federal forum.123 The approach has been criticized, however, on the grounds 
that considering a corporation’s pre-lawsuit activities improperly extends be-
yond the scope of the jurisdictional inquiry.124 Further, this rule may make a 
corporation a citizen of a state that it would not have been a citizen of prior to 
dissolution or inactivity.125 Finally, when a corporation has been inactive for a 
substantial length of time—and thus may have lost its local identity in the loca-
tion of its principal place of business while active—applying this rule could 
deny a federal forum to what has essentially become a foreign corporation.126 
2. Bright Line Approach: Ceasing Activities Strips Dual Citizenship 
At the opposite extreme, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
established a “bright line” rule that a dissolved or inactive corporation does not 
have a principal place of business and thus is only a citizen of its incorporating 
state.127 This approach rejects the notion that 28 U.S.C § 1332(c)(1) requires 
identification of a principal place of business for all corporations if such a 
place does not in fact exist.128 Further, to avoid inquiry into pre-lawsuit activi-
                                                                                                                           
these activities do not constitute transacting business. See Circle Indus., 183 F.3d at 108; Wm. Passa-
lacqua, 933 F.2d at 141. 
 122 See Wm. Passalacqua, 933 F.2d at 141. 
 123 See id. Allowing a federal forum would seem to undercut Congress’s intent when it amended 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) to indicate that a corporation is a citizen of its principal place of business. 
China Basin, 812 F. Supp. at 1040; see also S. REP. NO. 1830, at 4 (1958), reprinted in 1958 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101–02 (explaining that § 1332 was amended in response to the illogic of allow-
ing a corporation to obtain a federal forum in the state where it had its principal place of business). 
 124 See Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 290–91 (explaining that subject matter jurisdiction is determined 
only based on the citizenship of the parties at the commencement of a case (citing Freeport-
McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991)). 
 125 Harris v. Black Clawson Co., 961 F.2d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 1992) (characterizing this possibility 
as an “odd result”); see Yuncker, supra note 15, at 830 (criticizing the last business transaction ap-
proach because it could afford a corporation an undeserved federal forum). For example, this would 
occur if, just before becoming inactive, the corporation obtained a final judgment on an arbitration 
award in a state other than its incorporating state or the location of its headquarters. See Wm. Passa-
lacqua, 933 F.2d at 133 (concluding that a construction contract and preliminary construction work 
was sufficient activity to create a principal place of business). 
 126 Sports Shinko Co. v. QK Hotel, LLC, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1168, 1177 (D. Haw. 2007). Precluding 
access to federal courts does not adequately protect a corporation that has been inactive for many 
years prior to dissolution as this corporation has essentially become a foreign corporation that may 
experience prejudice in local courts. See id.  
 127 See, e.g., Grand Union, 316 F.3d at 411; Hansen, 48 F.3d at 696. 
 128 Grand Union, 316 F.3d at 411 (reasoning that a corporation must actually conduct business in 
order to have a principal place of business); Hansen, 48 F.3d at 696 (same). 
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ties, the bright line rule rejects any consideration of past transactions.129 In-
stead, courts utilizing this approach emphasize that a corporation is “a citizen 
of the state in which it has its principal place of business,” rather than the state 
in which it “has or has had” its principal place.130 In effect, the bright line rule 
that a dissolved or inactive corporation lacks a principal place of business cre-
ates a jurisdictional rule that is simple and predictable.131 
Despite these benefits, this approach may allow a once local corporation 
to nevertheless avail itself of a federal forum.132 The rule can be particularly 
problematic, as it could provide an undeserved federal forum to a local corpo-
ration “the day after it ceased business activities.”133 For example, application 
of the bright line rule could enable a corporation to have access to a federal 
court in the jurisdiction where it previously had its principal place of busi-
ness.134 The bright line rule has thus been criticized as contrary to Congress’s 
intent to limit federal diversity jurisdiction to parties that are truly from differ-
ent states.135 
3. Finding the Middle Ground: Case-by-Case Analysis to Determine 
Principal Place of Business 
Recognizing the drawbacks of the two extremes, the U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals for the Fourth and Fifth Circuits established a case-by-case analysis to 
                                                                                                                           
 129 See Grand Union, 316 F.3d at 410 (explaining that citizenship is determined at the time of the 
complaint); Hansen, 48 F.3d at 696 (same). 
 130 See Hansen, 48 F.3d at 698 (internal quotation marks omitted); id. (reasoning that the plain 
meaning of the statute supports the bright line rule); see also Grand Union, 316 F.3d at 411 (explain-
ing that a corporation only has a principal place of business to the extent that it exists in reality). 
 131 See Grand Union, 316 F.3d at 411 (emphasizing the benefits of certainty and clarity); Hansen, 
48 F.3d at 698 (same). 
 132 See Sports Shinko, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1178; see also Hansen, 48 F.3d at 700–01 (Seitz, J., 
dubitante) (noting that the bright line rule is simple and “may reflect the reality that an inactive corpo-
ration has no business activities” but that it “seems to run counter to the congressional purpose”); 
Yuncker, supra note 15, at 832 (explaining that the bright line approach enables corporations to have 
access to a federal court in a jurisdiction where it previously had its principal place of business). 
 133 Sports Shinko, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1178 (arguing that this advantage “may subvert the intent of 
Congress” because § 1332(c) was amended to prevent this result); see also Yuncker, supra note 15, at 
832 (arguing that the bright line approach is particularly illogical where a corporation has been inac-
tive for a short period of time). 
 134 See Hansen, 48 F.3d at 700–01 (Seitz, J., dubitante); Sports Shinko, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1178; 
Yuncker, supra note 15, at 832. 
 135 See Patel v. Sugen, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (observing that the rule 
has “the disadvantage of expanding the scope of diversity jurisdiction”); Yuncker, supra note 15, at 
833 (arguing that the bright line approach seems contrary to congressional intent, as it counteracts the 
purpose of the statute’s 1958 amendments). But see Grand Union, 316 F.3d at 412 (explaining that an 
inactive corporation “is in the same position as a foreign corporation in the eyes of the locality”). 
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determine whether a dissolved or inactive corporation conducts sufficient ac-
tivity to render a particular state its principal place of business.136 Rather than 
focus on the intricacies of the terminology in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), these 
courts preferred a flexible “facts and circumstances” approach.137 And alt-
hough the last business transaction remained a relevant factor for the principal 
place of business under this approach, it was not determinative.138 These courts 
considered other factors, including whether the corporation continued to have 
“any local impact” on the public and the amount of time since its last business 
activity, both of which are relevant for finding corporate citizenship.139 Within 
this case-by-case assessment, courts carved out a safe harbor for corporations 
that had been inactive for a “substantial” period of time.140 Under this ap-
proach, a substantial period of inactivity rendered a corporation a citizen of 
only its incorporating state as a matter of law.141 Courts that applied this ap-
proach reasoned that substantial inactivity transformed a corporation, in es-
sence, to an out-of-state citizen deserving of a federal forum.142 
A case-by-case analysis allowed courts to carry out Congress’s intent by 
limiting diversity jurisdiction.143 Further, assessing all of the facts and circum-
stances enabled conclusions that reflected a corporation’s activities and local 
character.144 This process, however, has been criticized as time-consuming and 
                                                                                                                           
 136 See Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 291; Harris, 961 F.2d at 551. District courts within the Ninth 
Circuit have also adopted a case-by-case assessment in this context. See Sports Shinko, 486 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1177; Patel, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 1112. 
 137 See Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 291–92; Harris, 961 F.2d at 551. 
 138 See Harris, 961 F.2d at 551 (reasoning that treating the last business transaction as a non-
determinative factor would avoid potentially odd results). 
 139 Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 291–92 (explaining that an inactive corporation could have a “con-
tinuing impact . . . sufficient to give it a geographical identity there”); see Harris, 961 F.2d at 551 
(considering these factors). 
 140 See Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 291–92 (concluding that three years was “substantial”); Harris, 
961 F.2d at 551 (holding that five years was “substantial”); cf. Sports Shinko, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1181 
(finding that less than two years was not “substantial”). Under this approach, the question of whether 
a period was sufficiently “substantial” for jurisdictional purposes was decided on a case-by-case basis. 
See Sports Shinko, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. 
 141 See Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 291–92; Harris, 961 F.2d at 551; Sports Shinko, 486 F. Supp. 2d 
at 1178. 
 142 Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 291–92; Harris, 961 F.2d at 551. 
 143 See Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 292; Harris, 961 F.2d at 551. 
 144 See Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 291 (“[A] court must analyze the facts of each case to determine 
. . . [whether] activity was sufficient to make it a citizen of the state of such activity.”); Harris, 961 
F.2d at 551 (reasoning that this approach is best suited to reflect the location where a corporation’s 
principal place of business was actually located). 
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unpredictable, as it was unclear which activities the court would prioritize and 
how much time would be deemed “substantial.”145 
III. HERTZ’S IMPLICATIONS FOR DISSOLVED AND INACTIVE CORPORATIONS 
By adopting the nerve center test for determining principal place of busi-
ness under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) to the exclusion of all prior approaches, the 
Supreme Court’s 2010 Hertz Corp. v. Friend decision altered the corporate 
citizenship analysis.146 After Hertz, a court can no longer simply rely on the 
principal place of business test previously adopted within its circuit.147 Instead, 
courts must consider whether and to what extent Hertz controls or is relevant 
to the citizenship question.148  
Because the Hertz Court did not explicitly carve out any exceptions to the 
nerve center test, however, the scope of the ruling remains unclear.149 Although 
the Court indicated that the nerve center test is the sole method for determining 
a corporation’s principal place business, perhaps the Court did not intend for 
the test to apply, or intended that it be applied differently, to corporations that 
do not easily fit under a nerve center test.150 Specifically, the impact of Hertz’s 
nerve center test for dissolved and inactive corporations is unclear, especially 
given the circuit split that had previously developed in this context.151  
                                                                                                                           
 145 See Patel, 354 F. Supp. 2d at 1112 (explaining that this case-by-case assessment carries out 
Congress’s intent “at the expense of definiteness”); Yuncker, supra note 15, at 831–32 (observing that 
the outcome of the “substantial” analysis is unclear). 
 146 See 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010); see also LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 23 (arguing 
that the nerve center test was intended as a uniform rule applicable to all corporate citizenship deter-
minations); Chaplin, supra note 10, at 92–93 (suggesting that although the Hertz Court intended a 
uniform rule to apply to all corporations, it is unclear how the nerve center test will be applied in unor-
thodox circumstances). 
 147 See 559 U.S. at 92 (adopting the nerve center test as the exclusive test for a corporation’s prin-
cipal place of business); see also Marion Cnty. Econ. Dev. Dist. v. Wellstone Apparel, LLC, No. 2:13-
CV-44-KS-MTP, 2013 WL 3328690, at *3–4 (S.D. Miss. July 2, 2013) (applying the nerve center test 
to a dissolved corporation rather than one of the pre-Hertz approaches). 
 148 See Holston Invs., Inc. B.V.I. v. LanLogistics Corp., 677 F.3d 1068, 1071 (11th Cir.) (holding 
that Hertz is relevant, but not binding for dissolved and inactive corporations and thereafter proceed-
ing to apply the bright line approach), cert. dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 499 (2012); Wellstone Apparel, 2013 
WL 3328690, at *3–4 (holding that Hertz controls the question of principal place of business for dis-
solved corporations). 
 149 See Chaplin, supra note 10, at 97 (arguing that for nontraditional corporations, it is unclear 
whether courts will “employ a traditional and more flexible nerve center test” or whether courts will 
“take a wooden approach to the nerve center test”). 
 150 See id. at 94 (suggesting the possibility of a more flexible application of the nerve center test 
in unorthodox circumstances). 
 151 Cf. 559 U.S. at 92 (adopting the nerve center test without mentioning the longstanding circuit 
split regarding treatment of dissolved and inactive corporations). See generally supra notes 112–145 
and accompanying text (expounding upon this circuit split). Courts have since reached opposing con-
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Given the unambiguous intent for a “more uniform interpretation” in 
Hertz, the nerve center test fundamentally alters the citizenship analysis for 
dissolved and inactive corporations.152 Prior to Hertz, the citizenship analysis 
for inactive or dissolved corporations was inconsistent, as it varied among the 
federal appeals courts.153 Thus, by articulating the need for a uniform ap-
proach, the Hertz Court necessitates a reexamination of the corporate citizen-
ship question in this context.154  
This Part examines the impact of Hertz on the various approaches for de-
termining the principal place of business of dissolved and inactive corpora-
tions.155 First, Section A considers the scope of the Hertz decision and con-
cludes that the nerve center test applies to every corporation, regardless of its 
active status.156 Section B then discusses Hertz’s significance for the previous-
ly utilized tests in this context, concluding that Hertz likely implicitly over-
rules each of them.157 
A. The Applicability and Significance of Hertz 
The Hertz Court expressly adopted the nerve center test and emphasized 
the need for jurisdictional predictability and administrative simplicity.158 In so 
holding, the Court declined to provide guidance to courts attempting to apply 
the rule in atypical cases.159 Specifically, the Hertz Court did not indicate the 
                                                                                                                           
clusions regarding the scope and relevance of Hertz’s nerve center test in this context. Compare Hol-
ston, 677 F.3d at 1071 (holding that Hertz does not control), with Wellstone Apparel, 2013 WL 
3328690, at *3–4 (holding that Hertz controls).  
 152 See 559 U.S. at 95–96; see also Chaplin, supra note 10, at 92 (arguing that despite the rule’s 
intended simplicity, “reasonable people will disagree about how to apply the new rule and the stand-
ards used to determine whether such rule has been met”). Although the Court acknowledged the exist-
ence of other “hard cases,” this Note focuses only on Hertz’s implications for dissolved and inactive 
corporations. See infra notes 186–234 and accompanying text. 
 153 See, e.g., Grand Union Supermarkets of the V.I., Inc. v. H.E. Lockhart Mgmt., Inc. 316 F.3d 
408, 411 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that a dissolved or inactive corporation does not have a principal 
place of business); Athena Auto., Inc. v. DiGregorio, 166 F.3d 288, 291 (4th Cir. 1999) (considering 
whether a particular inactive or dissolved corporation conducts sufficient activity to establish a princi-
pal place of business); Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 
141 (2d Cir. 1991) (assessing the place of the corporation’s last business transaction to determine its 
principal place of business); supra notes 112–145 and accompanying text. 
 154 See 559 U.S. at 95–96; Chaplin, supra note 10, at 97 (arguing that it is unclear how courts will 
apply the nerve center test in unconventional contexts). 
 155 See infra notes 158–234 and accompanying text. 
 156 See infra notes 158–185 and accompanying text. 
 157 See infra notes 186–234 and accompanying text. 
 158 See 559 U.S. at 94–95; accord Deverell, supra note 73, at 754 (explaining that the nerve center 
test provides certainty regarding corporate citizenship). 
 159 See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 95–96 (acknowledging the existence of “hard cases” when applying the 
nerve center test without elaborating on the appropriate approach for courts in these circumstances). 
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extent to which the nerve center test overruled the existing circuit split regard-
ing a dissolved or inactive corporation’s principal place of business.160 
 By expressly adopting the nerve center test without providing guidance 
for “hard cases,” the Hertz decision left open the question of whether the test 
applies to dissolved and inactive corporations.161 Nevertheless, the Hertz Court 
likely intended the nerve center test to apply to every corporation, regardless of 
its active or inactive status, because a broad application is consistent with both 
the absence of statutory exceptions and the fact that the Court did not expressly 
exempt any corporations in “hard cases.”162  
 First, reading an exception into diversity jurisdiction for dissolved and 
inactive corporations lacks statutory support.163 Despite the variety of corpo-
rate structures that exist, Congress did not indicate any exceptions within the 
text of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).164 Moreover, when amending the statute, Con-
gress intended to establish a citizenship rule that is easily administered.165 In-
terpreting the word “and” in § 1332(c)(1) as establishing conjunctive require-
ments, and thus a principal place of business determination for all corpora-
tions, accomplishes this intended simplicity.166  
                                                                                                                           
See generally Leading Cases, supra note 13, at 318 (predicting that courts will “struggle to develop a 
coherent common law doctrine in those ‘hard cases’ where novel fact patterns arise”).  
 160 See 559 U.S. at 95–96 (declining to mention the impact of the nerve center test on existing 
case law regarding dissolved and inactive corporations). 
 161 See id. at 94–95 (adopting the nerve center test but omitting any mention of dissolved or inac-
tive corporations). Importantly, recall that prior to Hertz, not only did the federal courts impose dis-
parate tests to determine a standard corporation’s principal place of business, see supra notes 53–70 
and accompanying text, but these courts also imposed wholly different tests in the event that a corpo-
ration was deemed inactive or dissolved, see supra notes 117–145 and accompanying text. In fact, at 
least one scholar has gone so far as to argue that even after the Hertz nerve center test, the pre-Hertz 
approaches to the citizenship of dissolved and inactive corporations “remain the law in their respective 
jurisdictions for the foreseeable future.” William D. Bolling III, Diversity Jurisdiction—Does a Dis-
solved Corporation Have a Principal Place of Business?—Holston Investments, Inc. B.V.I. v. LanLo-
gistics Corp., 677 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2012), 37 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 241, 246 (2013). 
 162 See infra notes 163–172 and accompanying text. 
 163 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012) (stating, without express limitation, that a corporation is 
deemed a citizen of its principal place of business). 
 164 See id. Congress’s silence in this regard is arguably significant, as Congress—in enacting the 
statute—was aware of the variations in corporate structures. See S. REP. NO. 1830, at 4 (1958), re-
printed in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101–02 (acknowledging the distinction between the corporate 
form and individuals and suggesting that the strategic differences drove the decision to amend 
§ 1332(c)); cf. Daniel L. Rotenberg, Congressional Silence in the Supreme Court, 47 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 375, 386 (1992) (“[Congressional] silence has meaning in the interpretative process, but what it 
means will vary from case to case.”). 
 165 See 13F WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 32, § 3625; see also supra notes 36–47 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Congress’s intent when amending § 1332). 
 166 Compare 13F WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 32, § 3625 (illustrating that by linking a corpo-
ration’s principal place of business to the existing analysis under the Bankruptcy Act, Congress in-
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 Second, carving out exceptions to the nerve center test may be incon-
sistent with Hertz.167 The Hertz Court adopted a bright line test and did not 
exempt specific categories of corporations on the grounds that they lack a 
principal place of business.168 The omission of any articulated exemptions 
suggests the broad applicability of the nerve center test to all citizenship de-
terminations.169 Indeed, the Court’s emphasis on simplicity and predictability 
illustrates an intent to establish a single test applicable to all corporations.170 
Moreover, Hertz’s silence on this issue is significant, as the Court had an op-
portunity—when defining principal place of business—to clarify the scope of 
the statutory requirement.171 Because the Court did not indicate that 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(c)(1) should be interpreted more narrowly than is explicitly indicated in 
the statute, it can be inferred that lower courts should refrain from limiting the 
application of the principal place of business requirement.172  
Conversely, the nerve center test may not apply to dissolved and inactive 
corporations, although this alternative is ultimately less compelling.173 First, 
the fact that dissolved and inactive corporations do not have a physical princi-
pal place of business may suggest that they are only citizens of their incorpo-
                                                                                                                           
tended for the citizenship test to be easily administrable), and China Basin Props. v. One Pass, Inc., 
812 F. Supp. 1038, 1040 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (treating the “and” as conjunctive and therefore streamlin-
ing the citizenship analysis by presuming the applicability of principal place of business citizenship), 
with SEG Vanguard Gen. Corp. v. Ji, 195 F. Supp. 2d 564, 568 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (indicating that to 
determine the applicability of principal place of business citizenship, a court must first engage in a 
preliminary inquiry regarding whether a corporation is active). 
 167 See 559 U.S. at 92 (explaining that the Court adopted the nerve center test “[i]n an effort to 
find a single, more uniform interpretation of [principal place of business]”); infra notes 168–172 and 
accompanying text. 
 168 See 559 U.S. at 92. See generally Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 853 F. Supp. 2d 487 
(E.D. Pa. 2012) (concluding that a holding company has only one nerve center because Hertz does not 
appear to create a “holding company exception”), aff’d, 724 F.3d 337 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 169 See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 93–94; SmithKline Beecham, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 495. 
 170 See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 94. Significantly, the Hertz Court stated that policies of simplicity and 
predictability should guide the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), even if doing so occasionally 
produces results inconsistent with the purpose of diversity jurisdiction. See id. The Court’s emphasis 
on these policy goals suggests that simplicity and predictability should also guide the application of 
the nerve center test, even if a court must occasionally strain to locate a physical principal place of 
business. See id.; SmithKline Beecham, 853 F. Supp. 2d at 495 (reasoning that a “holding company 
exception” would “necessitate the kind of ‘complex jurisdictional administration’ the Hertz Court 
condemned” (quoting Hertz, 559 U.S. at 94)). 
 171 See 559 U.S. at 93–94. 
 172 See id.; see also Rotenberg, supra note 164, at 386 (explaining that congressional silence 
could indicate that “Congress so obviously included the issue in the law that no comment was called 
for”). 
 173 See infra notes 174–185 and accompanying text. 
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rating states and thus that the nerve center test does not apply to them.174 Some 
courts have reasoned that these corporations do not conduct business activities 
and therefore do not have a principal place of business.175 By this logic, be-
cause dissolved and inactive corporations are only citizens of their incorporat-
ing states, Hertz’s nerve center holding may not have any impact on those cor-
porations or the circuit split that had developed in this context.176 Congress’s 
intended administrative simplicity when amending corporate citizenship rules, 
however, suggests that this disjunctive analysis overcomplicates the matter.177 
Moreover, the use of the conjunctive “and” in the statute suggests a single ap-
proach for all citizenship determinations, rather than a threshold analysis of a 
corporation’s active status.178  
                                                                                                                           
 174 See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 94–95 (recognizing the existence of “hard cases” and suggesting that a 
corporation’s nerve center—rather than a mailbox or an empty office—must be its true center of con-
trol); see also Holston, 677 F.3d at 1071 (reasoning that the Hertz nerve center test does not apply 
when a corporation is not active); SEG Vanguard, 195 F. Supp. 2d at 568 (assuming that only an active 
corporation has a principal place of business). In the congressional hearings when § 1332(c) was 
adopted, a Judicial Conference representative observed that, “in some situations[,] it might not be 
possible to identify a principal place of business.” See Jack H. Friedenthal, New Limitations on Fed-
eral Jurisdiction, 11 STAN. L. REV. 213, 224 (1959). This observation indicates that perhaps Congress 
anticipated exceptions to dual citizenship. See id. 
 175 See, e.g., Grand Union, 316 F.3d at 411 (reasoning that if a corporation does not conduct any 
activities, it cannot have a principal place of business); Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. Hansen, 48 F.3d 693, 
698 (3d Cir. 1995) (same). 
 176 See Holston, 677 F.3d at 1071 (declining to apply the Hertz nerve center test, reasoning that a 
dissolved corporation does not have a principal place of business and is thus a citizen of only its in-
corporating state); Notice of Removal of Defs. Red Strokes Entertainment, Inc. and Garth Brooks 
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (Diversity of Citizenship) at 5–6, Sanderson v. Brooks, No. 
2:13CV03497 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2013), 2013 WL 2296383 [hereinafter Red Strokes Notice of Re-
moval] (following Holston and holding that an inactive corporation is only a citizen of its incorporat-
ing state); Bolling, supra note 161, at 246 (assuming that the pre-Hertz state of the law remains in the 
context of dissolved and inactive corporations); see also Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Vacate 
Final J. and Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 8, Holston Invs. Inc. B.V.I. v. LanLo-
gistics, Corp., No. 08–21569–CIV–Moreno/Torres (S.D. Fla. June 18, 2010), 2010 WL 3899814 
[hereinafter Holston Memorandum] (suggesting that Hertz was merely persuasive authority in this 
context, as it did not involve the citizenship of a dissolved or inactive corporation). 
 177 See 13F WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 32, § 3625 (explaining that by linking a corporation’s 
principal place of business to the existing analysis under the Bankruptcy Act, Congress intended to 
create a rule that would be relatively simple for federal courts to apply); see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(c)(1) (2012) (stating, without express limitation, that a corporation is deemed a citizen of its 
principal place of business); S. REP. NO. 1830, at 4 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 
3101–02 (explaining that § 1332 was amended in response to the illogic of allowing a corporation to 
obtain a federal forum in the state where it had its principal place of business). 
 178 See S. REP. NO. 1830, at 5 (discussing the principal place of business amendment to § 1332(c) 
in terms of corporations generally without mentioning any exceptions); 13F WRIGHT & MILLER, su-
pra note 32, § 3625; see also Johnson v. Advance Am., 549 F.3d 932, 936 (4th Cir. 2008) (“The stat-
ute’s use of the conjunctive gives dual, not alternative, citizenship . . . .”). 
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Second, even if a dissolved or inactive corporation is in fact a citizen of a 
principal place of business, the Hertz Court may nevertheless have intended 
the nerve center test to apply to only active corporations.179 The phrase “prin-
cipal place of business” in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) could be interpreted in the 
colloquial notion of the phrase, rather than as a jurisdictional term of art.180 If 
Congress intended principal place of business to refer to a corporation’s actual 
physical location, a distinct test would need to be applied in contexts where the 
location is not obvious—e.g., when a corporation is inactive or dissolved.181 It 
is possible, however, to reconcile a colloquial interpretation of principal place 
of business with the nerve center test articulated in Hertz.182 Although an inac-
tive or dissolved corporation often does not have a traditional headquarters as 
contemplated in Hertz, it does not necessarily follow that such a corporation 
does not have a nerve center.183 Instead, it is more likely that the exclusive test 
                                                                                                                           
 179 Cf. Holston, 677 F.3d at 1071 (holding that the Hertz nerve center test did not control the citi-
zenship of dissolved and inactive corporations); Mamco Corp. v. Carlisle Cos., No. 10-C-0124, 2011 
WL 13646, at *1–2 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 4, 2011) (concluding that the nerve center test applies only to 
active corporations); see also Holston Memorandum, supra note 176, at 8 (suggesting that Hertz was 
merely persuasive authority in this context, as it did not involve the citizenship of a dissolved or inac-
tive corporation). 
 180 Cf. Hansen, 48 F.3d at 698 (concluding that courts should not strain to find a principal place of 
business if one does not in fact exist). Notably, the Supreme Court concluded that the phrase “princi-
pal place of business” under the Bankruptcy Act should be interpreted as referring to “the common 
acception of the phrase.” Royal Indem. Co. v. Am. Bond & Mortg. Co., 289 U.S. 165, 169 (1933). 
Despite this interpretation under the Bankruptcy Act, courts struggled to identify the principal place of 
business that Congress intended to recognize. See, e.g., In re Peachtree Lane Assoc., 150 F.3d 788, 
794 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that it was unclear whether an entity’s principal place of business 
under the Bankruptcy Act is the location of its daily operations or where major business decisions are 
made); In re Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 596 F.2d 1239, 1245–47 (5th Cir. 1979) (analyzing the 
principal place of business requirement under the Bankruptcy Act and concluding that it is likely the 
location of a corporation’s “general supervision,” rather than the location of its physical assets); In re 
Eagle Point Ltd. Dividend Hous. P’ship, 350 B.R. 84, 89 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2006) (characterizing the 
Fifth Circuit’s holding as the nerve center analysis and concluding that a corporation’s principal place 
of business was located in the location where major decisions are made and agreements are negotiat-
ed).  
 181 See Mamco, 2011 WL 13646, at *1–2. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wis-
consin in its 2011 decision Mamco Corp. v. Carlisle Companies interpreted Hertz as narrowly apply-
ing to only active corporations. Id. Determining that the corporation was inactive, the court applied an 
activity-based test rather than the nerve center test. See id. at *2–3. 
 182 Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012) (providing that a corporation is a citizen of the state in 
which it “has its principal place of business” (emphasis added)); Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92 (holding that a 
corporation’s nerve center is its “actual center of direction, control, and coordination”); Hansen, 48 
F.3d at 698 (reasoning that a plain meaning interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) suggests congres-
sional intent to identify a corporation’s current principal place of business).  
 183 See Mamco, 2011 WL 13646, at *3 (holding that a corporation in the process of dissolving has 
its principal place of business where its wind up activities are conducted); LanLogistics Petition, su-
pra note 11, at 23 (arguing that a dissolved corporation’s nerve center should be the location where the 
corporation is conducting litigation and wind up activities). 
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adopted in Hertz modified the analysis for all corporations and requires locat-
ing the nerve center to determine a corporation’s citizenship.184 In the dis-
solved and inactive corporation context, though, a corporation’s nerve center 
may ultimately point to a different location than a traditional headquarters.185 
B. Determining the Nerve Center of Dissolved and Inactive Corporations 
The nerve center test articulated in Hertz has implications for each of the 
principal place of business approaches that had previously developed for dis-
solved and inactive corporations.186 The Hertz Court held that the nerve center 
test is the exclusive test under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), rejecting the activity-
based jurisdictional tests that had previously been applied to active corpora-
tions.187 When determining the citizenship of inactive or dissolved corpora-
tions, however, federal appeals courts applied a distinct analysis.188 The Hertz 
Court did not refer to the various approaches applied to these corporations, but 
simply chose the nerve center test as the proper analysis for determining the 
principal place of business.189 
                                                                                                                           
 184 See 559 U.S. at 92 (adopting the nerve center test to the exclusion of all other prior principal 
place of business tests without indicating any exceptions); Wellstone Apparel, 2013 WL 3328690, at 
*3–4 (applying the nerve center test to a dissolved corporation and assessing the location of “overall 
direction, control, and coordination”); Leatherman v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., No. 12–3783, 2013 WL 
1285491, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2013) (applying the nerve center test to an inactive corporation). 
 185 See Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 292 (contemplating that an inactive or dissolved corporation’s 
nerve center could change); LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 23 (indicating that a dissolved 
corporation’s nerve center could be the place where wind up activities are conducted); see also Hertz, 
559 U.S. at 92, 94–95 (emphasizing simplicity and predictability as the driving justifications for the 
nerve center test). Importantly, when articulating the nerve center test, the Hertz Court acknowledged 
the existence of “hard cases.” See 559 U.S. at 95–96. Specifically, the Court provided two examples of 
“hard cases”: (1) a corporation with its headquarters in one state but visible activities in another, and 
(2) a corporation that decentralizes its nerve center functions and divides them among several states. 
Id. The Court’s examples of “hard cases” indicate that what constitutes the nerve center will vary in 
different contexts. See id.  
 186 See 559 U.S. at 92 (adopting the nerve center test to achieve a “more uniform interpretation of 
the statutory phrase”); LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 7–8 (arguing that Hertz abrogated the 
bright line test for dissolved and inactive corporations, as this approach was premised on the corporate 
activities test that the Court expressly rejected). 
 187 See 559 U.S. at 92 (concluding that the nerve center test is the sole means for determining a 
corporation’s principal place of business and rejecting the other “divergent and increasingly complex 
interpretations”). 
 188 See, e.g., Grand Union, 316 F.3d at 411 (holding that an inactive or dissolved corporation does 
not have a principal place of business); Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 291 (conducting a case-by-case 
analysis to determine whether a corporation conducts sufficient activity to have a principal place of 
business); Wm. Passalacqua, 933 F.2d at 141 (assessing the place of the corporation’s last business 
transaction without mentioning any of the principal place of business tests). 
 189 See 559 U.S. at 92, 95 (adopting the nerve center test as the exclusive test and recognizing the 
existence of “hard cases” without expressly referring to inactive or dissolved corporations); see also 
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It is unclear whether the pre-Hertz tests for dissolved and inactive corpo-
rations survive the Supreme Court’s articulation of the nerve center test.190 In-
deed, the circuit split that developed in this context was largely grounded in the 
activity-based jurisdictional tests that Hertz expressly overruled.191 Although 
the Hertz decision has different implications for each of the approaches to de-
termining the principal place of business of inactive or dissolved corporations, 
it likely overrules each of them.192  
1. Last Business Transaction Approach 
After Hertz, the last business transaction approach is flawed, as it is in-
consistent with the Court’s express holding.193 The Hertz Court defined nerve 
center as a corporation’s “actual center of direction, control, and coordina-
tion.”194 Equating a dissolved or inactive corporation’s principal place of busi-
ness with the location of its most recent business transaction while it was ac-
tive will often fail to locate its center of direction and control that actually ex-
ists after the change in active status.195 A corporation’s last business transaction 
could occur in any location—it is not limited to the location of its most recent 
                                                                                                                           
LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 7–8 (recognizing that Hertz did not involve a dissolved corpo-
ration and that the Court did not refer to inactive or dissolved corporations in its decision). 
 190 Cf. 559 U.S. at 92 (holding that the nerve center test is the exclusive principal place of busi-
ness test). Compare Wellstone Apparel, 2013 WL 3328690, at *3–4 (applying the nerve center test to a 
dissolved corporation), and LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 6–7 (arguing that the Court in-
tended the test to apply to all corporations, as the Hertz decision recognized the variety of different 
corporations but declined to distinguish between active and inactive or dissolved corporations), with 
Holston, 677 F.3d at 1071 (considering Hertz as merely persuasive in the context of dissolve and inac-
tive corporations and expressly adopting the bright line rule), and Rost v. Pfizer Inc., No. 11-
1383(DMC)(MF), 2011 WL 5238805, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 28, 2011) (applying the bright line rule rather 
than the nerve center test). 
 191 See LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 7–8 (suggesting that Hertz implicitly overruled the 
principal place of business tests in the inactive or dissolved corporation context because these ap-
proaches were based the on activity-based approaches that the Hertz Court expressly abrogated); see 
also Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92 (expressly overruling the activity-based tests). 
 192 See infra notes 193–234 and accompanying text. 
 193 See 559 U.S. at 92; see also LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 23 (arguing that the last 
business transaction rule fails to locate a dissolved or inactive corporation’s nerve center at the time of 
the complaint). 
 194 559 U.S. at 92 (emphasis added). Other courts analyzing a corporation’s principal place of 
business after Hertz have reasoned that the presently active center of control should be determinative 
for diversity purposes. See Wellstone Apparel, 2013 WL 3328690, at *3–4 (analyzing the nerve center 
functions of an administratively dissolved corporation that was continuing to operate); Letherman, 
2013 WL 1285491, at *1 (examining the control functions of an inactive corporation to locate its 
nerve center). 
 195 See LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 22–23 (explaining that the last business transac-
tion test will often fail to reflect a corporation’s principal place of business at the time of the com-
plaint).  
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principal place of business.196 When the last transaction occurred in a location 
other than the corporation’s most recent headquarters, this approach would 
produce a result that is inconsistent with Hertz’s intent for a predictable rule.197 
Moreover, even if the last business transaction occurred at the most recent 
headquarters, the application of this rule would be inconsistent with the 
Court’s holding to the extent that the corporation’s headquarters has ceased to 
be the actual center of direction and control post-dissolution or inactivity.198 
Conversely, because Hertz did not expressly abrogate the last business 
transaction test, it is possible that this approach partially survives the nerve 
center test.199 Particularly when the last business transaction occurs in the loca-
tion of a corporation’s headquarters, this approach is simple to apply and leads 
to predictable results.200 Moreover, the approach is consistent with the con-
junctive interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), as equating the principal 
place of business with the location of its last business transaction would ensure 
                                                                                                                           
 196 See Wm. Passalacqua, 933 F.2d at 133 (concluding that a construction contract and prelimi-
nary construction work was sufficient activity to create a principal place of business); see also Harris 
v. Black Clawson Co., 961 F.2d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting the possibility that this test could 
confer citizenship in a location where a corporation could not have been a citizen while active and 
characterizing this as an “odd result”); LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 17–18 (explaining that 
the principal place of business under the last business transaction test is the location where a corpora-
tion most recently transacted business); Yuncker, supra note 15, at 830 (arguing that this approach 
could produce “absurd results”). 
 197 See 559 U.S. at 94–95 (emphasizing the importance of a simple, predicable rule). Moreover, 
applying the last principal place of business rule would be complex and unpredictable if a corporation 
had never been active. Cf. Noland v. Pelletier, No. 2:09-cv-02035-MCE-DAD, 2010 WL 1404621, at 
*2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2010) (applying the bright line rule in this context). 
 198 See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92 (holding that the nerve center is the “actual center of direction, con-
trol, and coordination”); see also Wellstone Apparel, 2013 WL 3328690, at *3–4 (focusing on the 
current location of the dissolved corporation’s center of direction and control). 
 199 See Circle Indus. USA, Inc. v. Parke Constr. Grp., Inc., 183 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(holding that the corporation was a citizen of the state in which it last transacted business); Wm. Pas-
salacqua, 933 F.2d at 141 (same); City of Syracuse v. Loomis Armored U.S., LLC, No. 5:11-cv-
00744, 2011 WL 6318370, at *3–4 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2011) (same). The U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of New York in its 2011 decision in City of Syracuse v. Loomis Armored equated the 
inactive corporation’s principal place of business with the location in which it last conducted busi-
ness—its headquarters. 2011 WL 6318370, at *4. Although the court did not cite to Hertz or use the 
term nerve center in its analysis, presumably the court would have reached the same result if it had 
applied Hertz. See id. 
 200 Cf. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 94–95 (emphasizing simplicity and predictability). Because the corpora-
tion’s principal place of business would remain unchanged from its nerve center while it was active, 
this rule would not require a more fact-based assessment than is necessary under the normal nerve 
center test. See id. Moreover, a corporation’s nerve center while active will often be easily identifiable, 
as it will generally be its most recent headquarters. See id. at 92. 
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that every corporation could meet the statutory requirements.201 Continuing to 
apply this rule after Hertz will require new reasoning, however, as courts that 
applied this standard focused on the corporation’s most recent activity.202 Fur-
ther, the rule ceases to be simple or predictable in the event that the last trans-
action occurred in a location other than the location of the corporation’s most 
recent headquarters.203 Given the possibility of absurd results, and because the 
rationale behind the rule is inconsistent with Hertz, the last business transac-
tion approach most likely does not survive the Court’s articulation of the nerve 
center test.204 
2. Bright Line Approach: No Nerve Center in This Context 
The bright line rule misinterprets § 1332(c)(1), conflicts with Hertz’s ex-
press holding, and is often neither simple nor predictable.205 First, the bright 
line rule creates an exception to the conjunctive requirements of § 1332(c)(1) 
for an entire class of corporations, an exception that is not supported by the 
statute.206 Indeed, the dual citizenship requirement reflects the reality that a 
corporation’s local presence can be sufficient to render it a citizen of more than 
one state.207 The mere fact that a corporation has dissolved or become inactive 
                                                                                                                           
 201 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012); see also China Basin, 812 F. Supp. at 1040 (interpreting 
the statute as consisting of two conjunctive requirements and equating an inactive corporation’s prin-
cipal place of business with its last principal place of business while it was active). 
 202 See Holston, 677 F.3d at 1071 (criticizing the last principal place of business approach because 
it “focuses not on a corporation’s nerve center but where business was last conducted”); cf. Wm. Pas-
salacqua, 933 F.2d at 141 (applying the last principal place of business test and examining the activi-
ties that led to the litigation to determine citizenship). 
 203 See LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 21 (indicating that there is confusion regarding the 
application of the last business transaction test); see also Hertz, 559 U.S. at 93–94 (emphasizing sim-
plicity and predictability as the driving forces behind the nerve center test); Harris, 961 F.2d at 551 
(characterizing this possibility as an “odd result”). 
 204 See LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 7–8 (suggesting that approaches premised on 
activity-based analyses do not survive Hertz); see also Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92 (adopting the nerve cen-
ter test and expressly overruling the activity-based tests). 
 205 See infra notes 206–228 and accompanying text. 
 206 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (consisting of a conjunctive “and” rather than “or” and not explic-
itly indicating any exceptions to the rule); see also Yuncker, supra note 15, at 832 (“[D]isregarding the 
search for a principal place of business is strongly at odds with the requirement . . . of the place of 
incorporation as well as the principal place of business.”). 
 207 See S. REP. NO. 1830, at 4 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101–02 (explaining 
that § 1332 was amended in response to the illogic of allowing a corporation to obtain a federal forum 
in the state where it had its principal place of business); Levy, supra note 89, at 667–68 (explaining 
that Congress intended to prevent corporations with a local presence from invoking diversity jurisdic-
tion in a federal court in that state). 
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does not necessarily indicate that the corporation ceases to have a local pres-
ence.208  
Second, the Hertz Court did not indicate any exceptions to the nerve cen-
ter test or to the statutory principal place of business requirement.209 Applying 
the bright line rule often fails to locate a dissolved or inactive corporation’s 
“actual” center of direction and control at the time of the complaint.210 A dis-
solved or inactive corporation will often continue to maintain a location from 
which it conducts wind up activity or pursues lawsuits.211 Moreover, the bright 
line rule is internally inconsistent, as it relies on the colloquial meaning of 
principal place of business but disregards the reality that a corporation might 
continue to have an actual nerve center despite its dissolution or inactivity.212 
Third, applying the bright line rule is often not simple or predictable.213 
For example, when a corporation’s status is unclear, courts have engaged in a 
threshold inquiry concerning whether a corporation is “inactive” prior to ap-
plying the bright line rule.214 This threshold inquiry conflicts with the Hertz 
Court’s rejection of fact-based assessments of corporate activities.215 Further-
                                                                                                                           
 208 See S. REP. NO. 1830, at 4; see also Levy, supra note 89, at 687–88 (explaining that given the 
overall anti-prejudice purpose behind diversity jurisdiction, Congress only intended to provide a cor-
poration with access to a federal forum if it does not have “local ties” to a jurisdiction). 
 209 See 559 U.S. at 92; see also LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 8 (arguing that the Hertz 
Court requires every corporation to have a nerve center and intended to articulate “a single uniform 
rule to be applied in every case involving a corporation”). 
 210 See LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 22–23 (arguing that this approach “ignores the 
reality that businesses do not cease to exist upon the closing of their doors”); see also Hertz, 559 U.S. 
at 92 (holding that the nerve center is the “actual” location of direction and control). 
 211 See Mamco, 2011 WL 13646, at *2 (observing that, after the corporation had closed, its board 
of directors maintained a central location to conduct wind up activities); LanLogistics Petition, supra 
note 11, at 3 n.1 (explaining that the corporation in the case directed the post-dissolution winding up 
of its business from its headquarters). Most states have a statute indicating that a corporation will 
continue to exist for a specified period of time after dissolution. 16A FLETCHER, supra note 101, 
§ 7966; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 278 (2011) (specifying that a dissolved corporation contin-
ues to exist for three years to engage in wind up activities and litigation). 
 212 See LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 3 (arguing that the corporation’s nerve center was 
the place from which it directed and controlled its wind up activities); cf. Holston, 677 F.3d at 1071 
(holding that a dissolved corporation does not have an actual principal place of business and thus is a 
citizen of only its incorporating state). 
 213 See Rost, 2011 WL 5238805, at *2 (conducting a threshold inquiry into corporation’s active 
status before deciding to not apply the bright line rule). But see Holston, 677 F.3d at 1071 (explaining 
that the clarity and predictability of a bright line rule justifies results that are occasionally at odds with 
the purposes of diversity jurisdiction). 
 214 See Rost, 2011 WL 5238805, at *2 (assessing the activities of the company’s employees before 
conducting a principal place of business analysis); Noland, 2010 WL 1404621, at *2 (engaging in an 
analysis of the company’s activities before concluding that it was always an inactive corporation). 
 215 Compare Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92–93 (adopting the nerve center test to the exclusion of other 
fact-based approaches), with Mamco, 2011 WL 13646, at *1–2 (performing a threshold inquiry of the 
company’s status by assessing the corporation’s various wind up activities). Moreover, the threshold 
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more, because a threshold inquiry is often the first step when applying the 
bright line rule, this two-step analysis undermines its purported justifications 
of simplicity and predictability.216 
Alternatively, after Hertz, it is possible that the bright line rule applies and 
immediately strips a corporation of a nerve center upon inactivity or dissolu-
tion.217 First, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) may support this approach if principal 
place of business is interpreted based on its colloquial meaning.218 Because a 
corporation’s citizenship is based on where it has—rather than where it “has or 
has had”—its principal place of business, § 1332(c)(1) might not require a 
principal place of business for a corporation if such a physical place does not 
in fact exist.219 Second, Hertz might support the bright line rule, as the Court 
indicated that a corporation’s nerve center will generally be in the location of 
its headquarters.220 By negative implication, this observation could suggest that 
a corporation without a headquarters does not have a nerve center.221 Moreo-
ver, in some cases, applying the bright line rule would be simple and predicta-
                                                                                                                           
inquiry that is often involved is inconsistent with the Hertz Court’s emphasis on administrative sim-
plicity. See 559 U.S. at 94–95. 
 216 Compare Rost, 2011 WL 5238805, at *2 (discussing the functions of employees and conclud-
ing that the acquired corporation was not sufficiently inactive to justify application of the bright line 
rule), and Noland, 2010 WL 1404621, at *2 (conducting a brief threshold analysis before concluding 
that a corporation was inactive), with Holston, 677 F.3d at 1071 (justifying the bright line approach as 
the most simple and predictable rule). 
 217 See Holston, 677 F.3d at 1071 (concluding that a dissolved corporation is only a citizen of its 
incorporating state); see also Grand Union, 316 F.3d at 411 (holding that a corporation that does not 
actually conduct business activities does not have a principal place of business); Hansen, 48 F.3d at 
696 (same); Bolling, supra note 161, at 246 (assuming that the pre-Hertz state of the law remains in 
the context of dissolved and inactive corporations). For example, district courts in the Third Circuit 
have also continued to apply the bright line rule. See Rost, 2011 WL 5238805, at *2 (concluding that 
an inactive corporation does not conduct corporate activities and thus does not have a principal place 
of business); Wolman v. Petro Technik, Inc., No. 11-1623(SDW), 2011 WL 5082237, at *8 (D.N.J. 
Sept. 16, 2011) (same); Noland, 2010 WL 1404621, at *2 (same). 
 218 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012). Because Congress did not define principal place of busi-
ness, the phrase could be interpreted in this way. See id.; Hansen, 48 F.3d at 698 (holding that Con-
gress did not intend for courts to “strain to locate a principal place of business when no such place in 
reality exists”); supra notes 179–185 and accompanying text (elaborating on this interpretation of 
§ 1332). 
 219 See Grand Union, 316 F.3d at 411 (internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining that Con-
gress did not intend for courts to identify a principal place of business that does not in fact exist); 
Hansen, 48 F.3d at 698 (same); see also Wolman, 2011 WL 5082237, at *8 (declining to look to the 
corporation’s last principal place of business and concluding that the inactive corporation did not have 
a principal place of business because it was not currently conducting any activities). 
 220 Cf. 559 U.S. at 93 (“[I]n practice, [the nerve center] should normally be the place where the 
corporation maintains its headquarters . . . .”). 
 221 See id.; Holston, 677 F.3d at 1071 (interpreting the nerve center test in this way); Chaplin, 
supra note 10, at 92–93 (arguing that, after Hertz, it remains unclear whether courts must apply the 
nerve center test in every case). 
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ble.222 Upon determining that a corporation is dissolved or inactive, no further 
inquiry would be required.223 
As with the last business transaction rule, however, continuing to apply 
the bright line rule would require new reasoning after Hertz.224 Courts previ-
ously justified the bright line rule because dissolved and inactive corporations 
do not conduct any actual business activities, which conflicts with the Hertz 
Court’s express rejection of activity-based jurisdictional tests.225 Further, it is 
more consistent with Hertz and the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) to reconcile 
a colloquial interpretation of principal place of business with the nerve center 
test.226 Doing so is consistent with the statute, which indicates conjunctive re-
quirements for corporate citizenship.227 Additionally, because the Hertz Court 
observed that the nerve center will not always be located at the corporation’s 
headquarters, it does not necessarily follow that an inactive or dissolved corpo-
ration does not have a nerve center.228 
3. Multifactor Case-by-Case Analysis 
The Hertz Court’s express rejection of multifactor principal place of busi-
ness assessments implicitly overruled the pre-Hertz case-by-case analysis of 
                                                                                                                           
 222 Compare Hertz, 559 U.S. at 94–95 (advocating for the predictability and simplicity of jurisdic-
tional rules), with Holston, 677 F.3d at 1071 (emphasizing that the bright line rule is the best way to 
carry out the policies behind the ruling in Hertz). 
 223 See Holston, 677 F.3d at 1071 (using the policies of simplicity and predictability to justify 
adopting the bright line rule); see also Noland, 2010 WL 1404621, at *2 (concluding that the corpora-
tion is only a citizen of its incorporating state after determining that the corporation had never been 
active). 
 224 See 559 U.S. at 92; LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 7 (observing that the bright line 
rule was premised on an assessment of “corporate activities”). 
 225 Compare Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92 (adopting the nerve center test as the sole test for principal 
place of business), with Grand Union, 316 F.3d at 411 (focusing on whether the corporation conducted 
“any actual business activity”), and Hansen, 48 F.3d at 696, 698 (same). 
 226 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012) (providing that a corporation is a citizen of the state in 
which it “has its principal place of business” (emphasis added)); Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92 (holding that a 
corporation’s nerve center is its “actual center of direction, control, and coordination”).  
 227 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); see also China Basin, 812 F. Supp. at 1040 (reasoning that the 
statute’s use of “and” suggests that each corporation must always be a citizen of both its incorporating 
state and its principal place of business); supra notes 112–116 and accompanying text (discussing the 
conjunctive requirement interpretation of § 1332(c) in full). 
 228 See 559 U.S. at 92, 96–97 (observing that the nerve center would generally be the corporate 
headquarters, but contemplating a different location in “hard cases”); see also Mamco, 2011 WL 
13646, at *3 (holding that a corporation in the process of dissolving has its principal place of business 
where its wind up activities are conducted); LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 23 (arguing that a 
dissolved corporation’s nerve center should be the location where the corporation is conducting litiga-
tion and wind up activities). 
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dissolved and inactive corporations.229 This case-by-case approach analyzed an 
inactive or dissolved corporation’s activities and local character, arriving at a 
principal place of business conclusion that reflected the nature of the corpora-
tion.230 This “facts and circumstances” approach may carry out Congress’s in-
tent for creating diversity jurisdiction—to prevent out-of-state prejudice in 
state courts—because assessing the facts will often reveal whether a corpora-
tion is truly out of state.231 Ultimately, however, the test is inconsistent with the 
Hertz Court’s emphasis on “straightforward rules” that achieve jurisdictional 
simplicity and predictability even at the expense of the traditional rationales 
for diversity jurisdiction.232 Indeed, Hertz accepted that by adopting the nerve 
center test to achieve simplicity, a corporation’s principal place of business 
would sometimes not be located in the state in which it was least likely to ex-
perience prejudice.233 Accordingly, since Hertz, lower courts do not appear to 
be applying this case-by-case assessment to determine the citizenship of dis-
solved and inactive corporations.234 
                                                                                                                           
 229 See 559 U.S. at 92; see also LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 23 (arguing that this case-
by-case approach impermissibly assesses corporate activities, rather than the nerve center). 
 230 Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 291–92 (explaining that an inactive corporation could have a “con-
tinuing impact . . . sufficient to give it a geographical identity there”); Harris, 961 F.2d at 551 (consid-
ering a variety of factors, including whether the corporation continued to have “any local impact” on 
the public and the amount of time since its last business activity). 
 231 See S. REP. NO. 1830, at 4 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101–02 (explaining 
that § 1332 was amended in response to the illogic of allowing a corporation to obtain a federal forum 
in the state where it had its principal place of business); Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 291 (“[A] court 
must analyze the facts of each case to determine . . . [whether] activity was sufficient to make it a 
citizen of the state of such activity.”); Harris, 961 F.2d at 551 (reasoning that this approach is best 
suited to reflect the location where a corporation’s principal place of business was actually located). 
 232 See 559 U.S. at 92–93 (rejecting fact-based tests in favor of simplicity); see also Patel v. 
Sugen, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (explaining that this case-by-case assess-
ment carries out Congress’s intent “at the expense of definiteness”); Yuncker, supra note 15, at 831–
32 (observing that the outcome of the case-by-case analysis is unpredictable). See generally Harris, 
961 F.2d at 551 (applying a multifactor test). 
 233 See 559 U.S. at 95 (“We also recognize that the use of a ‘nerve center’ test may in some cases 
produce results that seem to cut against the basic rationale for 28 U.S.C. § 1332.”). 
 234 See, e.g., Holston, 677 F.3d at 1071 (declining to follow the case-by-case assessment used in 
the Fourth and Fifth Circuits because “simple jurisdictional tests are preferable”); Wellstone Apparel, 
2013 WL 3328690, at *3–4 (applying the nerve center test to a dissolved corporation); Leatherman, 
2013 WL 1285491, at *1 (applying the nerve center test to an inactive corporation); Loomis Armored, 
2011 WL 6318370, at *3–4 (applying the last business transaction test); Rost, 2011 WL 5238805, at 
*2 (applying the bright line rule). 
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IV. STATUS-LINKED NERVE CENTER: THE ACTUAL CENTER OF DIRECTION, 
CONTROL, AND COORDINATION 
Given the inadequacies of the other alternatives, a corporation’s nerve 
center should be directly linked to its active status.235 For example, when a 
corporation becomes dissolved or inactive, this change of status should trigger 
the assignment of a new nerve center.236 This new nerve center is the place 
from which the corporation directs and controls litigation and wind up and ac-
tivities.237 Importantly, this approach is consistent with the conjunctive re-
quirements in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), as it declines to create a jurisdictional 
exception for dissolved and inactive corporations.238 Moreover, a status-linked 
nerve center is in line with the Supreme Court’s holding in the 2010 case Hertz 
Corp. v. Friend, as it recognizes the corporation’s “actual” center of control at 
the time of the litigation.239 Finally, this approach establishes a simple, predict-
                                                                                                                           
 235 Compare Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92 (2010) (adopting the nerve center test to the 
exclusion of other fact-based approaches), and supra notes 186–234 and accompanying text (illustrat-
ing the inconsistencies between the required Hertz nerve center test and the prior approaches used to 
determine an inactive or dissolved corporation’s principal place of business), with Athena Auto., Inc. 
v. DiGregorio, 166 F.3d 288, 292 (4th Cir. 1999) (observing that a dissolved corporation’s nerve cen-
ter could be located at the place from which it was conducting its litigation), Mamco Corp. v. Carlisle 
Cos., No. 10-C-0124, 2011 WL 13646, at *2–3 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 4, 2011) (holding that the principal 
place of business is the state from which the wind up operations are directed), and LanLogistics Peti-
tion, supra note 11, at 5–6 (arguing that the location where a dissolved corporation conducts wind up 
activities establishes a nerve center). Notably, in 2011 in Mamco Corp. v. Carlisle Companies, the 
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin suggested that the nerve center test should—
at the very least—apply to a dissolving corporation. See 2011 WL 13646, at *2. Nevertheless, there is 
no reason that this rule should not logically extend to dissolved corporations for the specified statutory 
period of post-dissolution existence. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 278 (2011); Mamco, 2011 WL 
13646, at *2; 16A FLETCHER, supra note 101, § 7966 (explaining that state corporate laws authorize 
post-dissolution corporate existence for the corporation to wind up, litigate, and liquidate assets). 
Note, though, that the Mamco court suggested the continued application of the last business transac-
tion test to determine the nerve center of an inactive corporation. See 2011 WL 13646, at *2. In con-
trast, this Note proposes the adoption of this rule with regard to both dissolved and inactive corpora-
tions. See infra notes 236–290 and accompanying text. 
 236 See Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 292; Mamco, 2011 WL 13646, at *3; LanLogistics Petition, 
supra note 11, at 2–3 (arguing that the nerve center should be associated with the place where wind up 
activities are directed). Upon becoming inactive or dissolved, the corporation’s citizenship would be 
based on the location of its new nerve center—not its previous one. See Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 292. 
 237 See Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 292; Mamco, 2011 WL 13646, at *1–2; LanLogistics Petition, 
supra note 11, at 3. 
 238 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012); Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 58 (1930) (holding that 
“and” is ordinarily conjunctive when utilized in a statute); Johnson v. Advance Am., 549 F.3d 932, 935 
(4th Cir. 2008) (analyzing § 1332(c)(1) and concluding that the “statute’s use of the conjunctive gives 
dual, not alternative, citizenship”); infra notes 255–269 and accompanying text (explaining that this 
approach is consistent with the diversity statute). 
 239 See 559 U.S. at 92 (holding that the nerve center is the “actual” location of direction and con-
trol); LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 5, 22–23 (asserting that the place from which a dissolved 
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able rule, as it directly reflects the corporation’s actual status at the time of the 
lawsuit.240 
After Hertz, a corporation’s principal place of business must be deter-
mined by reference to its nerve center.241 According to the Court, the nerve 
center is a corporation’s “actual center of direction, control, and coordina-
tion.”242 By framing the nerve center as the “actual” location of direction and 
control, the Hertz Court’s definition suggests a nerve center in which a corpo-
ration’s principal place of business is directly linked to its active status.243 
For dissolved and inactive corporations, identifying the “actual” location 
of control requires determining the place from which the corporation’s officers 
are presently conducting its “direction, control, and coordination” functions.244 
Often, these control functions will involve directing the corporation’s litigation 
                                                                                                                           
or inactive corporation conducts wind up activities reflects its actual nerve center at the time of the 
complaint); infra notes 270–281 and accompanying text (explaining that this approach is consistent 
with Hertz). 
 240 See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 94–95 (emphasizing the need for a simple and predictable unified rule); 
infra notes 282–290 and accompanying text (explaining that this rule is both simple and predictable); 
cf. Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 853 F. Supp. 2d 487, 495 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (reasoning that a 
“holding company exception” would “necessitate the kind of ‘complex jurisdictional administration’ 
the Hertz Court condemned” (quoting Hertz, 559 U.S. at 94)), aff’d, 724 F.3d 337 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 241 559 U.S. at 92; see also Marion Cnty. Econ. Dev. Dist. v. Wellstone Apparel, LLC, No. 2:13-
CV-44-KS-MTP, 2013 WL 3328690, at *3–4 (S.D. Miss. July 2, 2013) (applying the nerve center 
test—rather than one of the pre-Hertz approaches—to a dissolved corporation); SmithKline Beecham, 
853 F. Supp. 2d at 495 (declining to adopt an exception to the nerve center test for holding compa-
nies); Chaplin, supra note 10, at 97 (implying that the nerve center test applies to all corporations, but 
suggesting that courts might apply a “more flexible nerve center test” in unconventional contexts); 
supra notes 158–185 and accompanying text (explaining why Hertz’s nerve center test is controlling 
even in cases of atypical corporations). But see Holston Invs., Inc. B.V.I. v. LanLogistics Corp., 677 
F.3d 1068, 1071 (11th Cir.) (holding that Hertz is relevant, but not binding for dissolved and inactive 
corporations and proceeding to apply the bright line approach rather than the nerve center test), cert. 
dismissed, 133 S. Ct. 499 (2012). 
 242 Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92 (emphasis added); see LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 14 (argu-
ing that because a dissolved corporation conducts wind up activities and litigation, it retains an “actu-
al” center of direction and control and, thus, retains a nerve center). 
 243 See 559 U.S. at 92; see also Mamco, 2011 WL 13646, at *3 (holding that a corporation in the 
process of dissolving has its principal place of business where its wind up activities are conducted); 
LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 5, 14 (arguing that a dissolved corporation’s nerve center 
should be the location where the corporation is conducting litigation and wind up activities). 
 244 Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92 (holding that the nerve center is the “actual center of direction, control, 
and coordination”); see Wellstone Apparel, 2013 WL 3328690, at *4 (concluding that a dissolved 
corporation’s nerve center was located where the corporation’s major transactions were negotiated); 
Mamco, 2011 WL 13646, at *3 (holding that a corporation in the process of dissolving has its princi-
pal place of business where its wind up activities are conducted); LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, 
at 14 (arguing that because a dissolved corporation conducts wind up activities and litigation, it retains 
an “actual” center of direction and control, and thus retains a nerve center). 
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or wind up activities.245 Upon dissolution or inactivity, a corporation’s former 
headquarters cease to be its actual center of control if the post-dissolution con-
trol functions are conducted from a different location.246 When such a change 
occurs, the corporation’s nerve center should reflect the new location from 
which it actually directs and controls its litigation and wind up activities.247 
From the time of this change until all litigation and wind up activities cease, a 
corporation should be both a citizen of its incorporating state and of its princi-
pal place of business—the location of its new nerve center.248  
Because the Hertz Court emphasized the need for a uniform jurisdictional 
rule that is both simple and predictable, a corporation’s change in status and 
control functions should not render the nerve center test inapplicable.249 Sec-
tion 1332(c)(1) indicates that every corporation has dual citizenship in both its 
incorporating state and the state of its principal place of business.250 The fact 
that a corporation is no longer active does not alter the requirements of the 
statute.251 Section A argues that the text of § 1332(c)(1) supports status-linked 
corporate citizenship.252 Section B then asserts that this approach is consistent 
with Hertz’s express holding and will often locate the state in which a dis-
solved or inactive corporation is least likely to suffer out-of-state prejudice.253 
                                                                                                                           
 245 See Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 292 (observing that a dissolved corporation’s nerve center could 
be located at the place from which it was conducting its litigation); Mamco, 2011 WL 13646, at *3 
(focusing on the state where the corporation’s wind up activities were conducted); LanLogistics Peti-
tion, supra note 11, at 14 (explaining that wind up activities and litigation can allow a dissolved cor-
poration to retain a nerve center). 
 246 See Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 292; see also LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 7, 9 (im-
plying that the nerve center could change if the wind up activities were directed from a new location). 
 247 See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92 (holding that the nerve center is the “actual” location of direction 
and control); LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 7, 9; cf. Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 292 (contem-
plating that, upon dissolution, a corporation’s nerve center could change from the place where it pre-
viously conducted business to the place where it directs its litigation). 
 248 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012); Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92; LanLogistics Petition, supra note 
11, at 3, 7, 9. 
 249 See 559 U.S. at 92, 94–95; LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 9 (“The fact that the corpo-
ration has dissolved and is winding up does not mean that it has no place of direction and control and 
thus no principal place of business.”). 
 250 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); Crooks, 282 U.S. at 58 (concluding that “and” is generally con-
junctive); Johnson, 549 F.3d at 935 (holding that “and” in § 1332(c)(1) creates dual citizenship). 
 251 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (articulating dual citizenship requirements without expressly indi-
cating any exceptions); LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 9 (arguing that the statute requires 
every corporation to have a principal place of business and that a company’s dissolution does not 
render this requirement inapplicable).  
 252 See infra notes 255–269 and accompanying text. 
 253 See infra notes 270–281 and accompanying text. 
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Finally, Section C explains that, consistent with the policies emphasized in 
Hertz, this simple rule produces predictable jurisdictional results.254 
A. Section 1332(c)(1) Suggests a Status-Linked Principal  
Place of Business 
Reading § 1332(c)(1) as a whole indicates congressional intent to estab-
lish status-linked principal place of business citizenship.255 Interpreting the 
statute in this way gives meaning to the conjunctive “and” rather than reading 
each element as if it stood on its own.256 Moreover, strict statutory construction 
suggests that in the event that a corporation’s principal place of business is 
nonobvious, Congress intended for a corporation to be a citizen of its most 
prominent location under the circumstances.257 Rather than create a class of 
corporations exempt from one of the conjunctive 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) ele-
ments, the structure and text of the statute indicate that a corporation’s princi-
pal place of business should be defined by reference to the location in which it 
is presently most prominent.258 
                                                                                                                           
 254 See infra notes 282–290 and accompanying text. 
 255 See infra notes 256–269 and accompanying text; cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012) (articulat-
ing two distinct corporate citizenship requirements without any exceptions and indicating that a corpo-
ration is a citizen in the location where it has its principal place of business); Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 
292 (suggesting that a corporation’s principal place of business might change upon dissolution); 
LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 9–12 (analyzing a dissolved corporation’s principal place of 
business in light of the § 1332(c)(1) requisite conjunctive requirements). 
 256 See infra notes 259–263 and accompanying text; cf. Astra Oil Trading v. PRSI Trading Co., 
794 F. Supp. 2d 462, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (explaining that if § 1332(c) applies to foreign corporations, 
“it must confer dual-citizenship in both the foreign state of incorporation and . . . the principal place of 
business”). 
 257 See infra notes 264–269 and accompanying text; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (“[A] corpo-
ration shall be deemed to be a citizen of . . . the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of 
business . . . .” (emphasis added)); Mamco, 2011 WL 13646, at *2 (suggesting that a dissolving corpo-
ration will retain a principal place of business); LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 9–10 (arguing 
that a dissolved corporation’s most prominent location, and thus its principal place of business, is the 
place from which litigation is directed). See generally Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 
100, 108–09 (1941) (holding that federal jurisdiction statutes must be strictly construed), superseded 
by statute on other grounds, Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 1441, 62 Stat. 937, 937–38 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2012)), as recognized in Breuer v. Jim’s Concrete of 
Brevard, Inc., 538 U.S. 691, 697 (2003). 
 258 See infra notes 264–269 and accompanying text; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1); LanLogis-
tics Petition, supra note 11, at 9–10 (explaining that because a dissolved corporation continues to exist 
and § 1332 always requires a finding of both forms of citizenship, “[a dissolved corporation] must 
have a principal place of business . . . from which, at a minimum, any litigation is directed”). Declin-
ing to carve out an exception is consistent with the fact that Congress did not explicitly indicate any 
exceptions to the dual citizenship requirement. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c); cf. Rotenberg, supra note 
164, at 386 (explaining that congressional silence has meaning when interpreting a statute). 
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The structure of § 1332(c)(1) establishes two distinct and conjunctive el-
ements for diversity jurisdiction.259 Section 1332(c)(1) provides that a corpora-
tion is a citizen of its incorporating state “and” of its principal place of busi-
ness.260 Congress’s use of “and” is best read as a requirement that both citizen-
ship elements be met for any corporation to invoke diversity jurisdiction.261 
The word “and” is generally interpreted in the conjunctive unless doing so 
would lead to absurd results.262 Interpreting “and” in § 1332(c)(1) as conjunc-
tive is rational, as it will limit when diversity jurisdiction can be invoked and 
will ensure that federal jurisdiction does not encroach on the independence of 
the states.263  
Further, the plain meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) indicates Congress’s 
intent for each corporation to be a citizen of both its incorporating state and of 
the state where it currently “has its principal place of business.”264 Drawing 
from the plain meaning of the words chosen, the phrase “principal place” sug-
gests congressional intent to identify a singular prominent place within a 
state.265 When applied to dissolved and inactive corporations, the reference to 
                                                                                                                           
 259 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (using the conjunctive “and” rather than “or”); see also Comtec, 
Inc. v. Nat’l Tech. Sch., 711 F. Supp. 522, 524–25 (D. Ariz. 1989) (concluding that “and” indicates 
congressional intent “for all of the requirements of the statute to be fulfilled” for diversity citizenship 
to be invoked); 1A SINGER, supra note 114, § 21:14 (“Statutory phrases separated by the word ‘and’ 
are usually interpreted in the conjunctive.”); supra notes 112–116 and accompanying text (discussing 
the conjunctive requirement interpretation of § 1332(c) in full). 
 260 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
 261 See Johnson, 549 F.3d at 935 (analyzing § 1332(c)(1) and concluding that the “statute’s use of 
the conjunctive gives dual, not alternative, citizenship”); Comtec, 711 F. Supp. at 524–25 (same); 
LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 9 (“[T]he statute requires a determination, for every corpora-
tion, of a principal place of business . . . .”); cf. Levy, supra note 89, at 685–86 (arguing that § 1332(c) 
implies that all corporations have a principal place of business). 
 262 See Crooks, 282 U.S. at 58 (holding that “and” is ordinarily conjunctive when utilized in a 
statute); OfficeMax, Inc. v. United States, 428 F.3d 583, 589 (6th Cir. 2005) (observing that courts 
only interpret “and” as disjunctive “to avoid an incoherent reading of a statute”); see also Sosa v. 
Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 348 F.3d 979, 981, 983 (11th Cir. 2003) (concluding that “and” 
should be interpreted disjunctively only to prevent “irrational results”). 
 263 See Shamrock, 313 U.S. at 108–09 (explaining that jurisdictional rules must be strictly con-
strued); Crooks, 282 U.S. at 58 (holding that “and” is generally conjunctive); Levy, supra note 89, at 
684 (arguing that where diversity jurisdiction is unclear, the presumption should be against a finding 
of federal jurisdiction); see also S. REP. NO. 1830, at 4 (1958), reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 
3101–02 (suggesting that § 1332 was amended to add principal place of business citizenship to limit 
federal jurisdiction). 
 264 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012) (emphasis added); see also Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. Hansen, 
48 F.3d 693, 698 (3d Cir. 1995) (reasoning that this plain meaning interpretation suggests congres-
sional intent to identify a corporation’s current principal place of business); LanLogistics Petition, 
supra note 11, at 9 (explaining that § 1332(c)(1) does not distinguish between corporations based on 
active status). 
 265 See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 93 (citing 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 495 (2d ed. 1989)). Inter-
preting § 1332(c)(1) according to the plain meaning of the statutory text is consistent with the Hertz 
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the location in which a corporation “has its principal place of business” sug-
gests that corporate citizenship must be in a state in which the corporation is 
presently prominent.266 Some argue that the statute’s text indicates Congress’s 
intent to render the principal place of business element inapplicable to corpora-
tions that presently lack such an identifiably prominent place.267 Upon dissolu-
tion or inactivity, however, a corporation retains a prominent place in the state 
where it directs litigation and any wind up activity.268 Inferring congressional 
intent to create an exception for dissolved and inactive corporations thus mis-
construes the application of the § 1332(c)(1) principal place of business re-
quirement in this context.269 
B. Consistency with Hertz and the Purpose of Diversity Jurisdiction 
A status-linked nerve center rule generally reflects the purpose of diversi-
ty jurisdiction.270 Diversity jurisdiction aims to provide a neutral federal forum 
for an out-of-state party in order to prevent that party from experiencing preju-
                                                                                                                           
Court’s reasoning for adopting the nerve center test. See id. (analyzing the plain meaning of the words 
within the statutory text as support for the nerve center test); Chaplin, supra note 10, at 90 (discussing 
the structural support for Hertz’s adoption of the nerve center test, as illustrated by the Court’s plain 
meaning analysis of § 1332). 
 266 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (emphasis added); see also Hertz, 559 U.S. at 93 (indicating that 
the nerve center is a corporation’s “main, prominent” place); Hansen, 48 F.3d at 698 (reasoning that 
Congress’s intent is illustrated by its use of “has” rather than “has or had”); LanLogistics Petition, 
supra note 11, at 9–10 (observing that § 1332 does not distinguish between active and dissolved or 
inactive corporations and suggesting that an inactive or dissolved corporation is most prominent at the 
place in which it directs litigation). 
 267 Hansen, 48 F.3d at 698; see Holston, 677 F.3d at 1071 (explaining that a dissolved corporation 
does not currently have a principal place of business); Grand Union Supermarkets of the V.I., Inc. v. 
H.E. Lockhart Mgmt., Inc., 316 F.3d 408, 411–12 (3d Cir. 2003) (suggesting that § 1332(c)(1) refers 
to a corporation’s presently most prominent place, which can only exist if the corporation is actually 
conducting business); see also Friedenthal, supra note 174, at 224 (observing that “in some situations 
it might not be possible to identify a principal place of business”). 
 268 See Mamco, 2011 WL 13646, at *3; LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 10–11. A dis-
solved corporation could potentially continue to have a local identity and impact, as winding up a 
business after dissolution can consist of substantial activities over a long period of time. See LanLo-
gistics Petition, supra note 11, at 10–11 (citing Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 291). 
 269 See LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 11 (citing Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 291). 
 270 See infra notes 271–281 and accompanying text. Compare S. REP. NO. 1830, at 4 (1958), re-
printed in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101–02 (explaining that § 1332(c) was amended to provide a 
neutral federal forum for out-of-state citizens), with LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 10 (ex-
plaining that wind up activities will often create a “geographical identity” sufficient to render the 
corporation a citizen of that state (citing Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 291)). See generally Hertz, 559 
U.S. 77 (implying that despite occasionally anomalous results, a jurisdictional test should generally 
reflect the purpose of the statute). 
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dice in state court.271 Although Hertz ultimately concluded that simplicity and 
administrative efficiency are important objectives when developing a jurisdic-
tional test, the Court nevertheless implied that the test chosen should generally 
reflect the purpose of diversity jurisdiction.272 Ideally, the nerve center identi-
fied for each corporation should be the location in which the corporation is 
least likely to suffer out-of-state prejudice.273 When applied to dissolved and 
inactive corporations, to the extent that directing litigation and wind up activi-
ties creates public visibility, a status-linked nerve center rule will prevent a 
corporation from experiencing out-of-state prejudice.274 
                                                                                                                           
 271 S. REP. NO. 1830, at 4; cf. Yuncker, supra note 15, at 821 (explaining that the corporate citi-
zenship rules were amended to reflect the reality that many corporations engage in business in more 
than one state). 
 272 See 559 U.S. at 92, 96. The Hertz Court explained that the absence of public visibility is not 
necessarily determinative when locating a corporation’s principal place of business. Id. For instance, 
an active corporation with its headquarters in New York is a citizen of New York, even if it is most 
visible to the public in New Jersey. Id. (using this hypothetical to illustrate the significance of public 
visibility for citizenship determination). Notably, one commentator has suggested that any “principal 
place of business standard will sometimes produce anomalous results, and commended the Court’s 
selection of a test that is not very burdensome to apply. See Deverell, supra note 73, at 752–53. 
 273 See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92, 96; see also Friedenthal, supra note 174, at 219, 240–41 (indicating 
that a corporation’s principal place of business should be the location in which it is least likely to 
experience out-of-state prejudice).  
 274 See LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 10–11 (citing Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 292). 
Because a dissolved or inactive corporation continues to exist for these purposes, it will often retain a 
local character and public visibility in the state where it is directing its activities. See Athena Auto., 
166 F.3d 291. But see Wm. Passalacqua Builders, Inc. v. Resnick Developers S., Inc., 933 F.2d 131, 
141 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining that a dissolved or inactive corporation might continue to retain a local 
character, but noting that this character would be found at the corporation’s last principal place of 
business). The potential for local character and visibility reinforces the conclusion that such a corpora-
tion should be a citizen of the state in which these activities are directed. See LanLogistics Petition, 
supra note 11, at 10–11 (citing Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 292). Moreover, by treating dissolution and 
inactivity as jurisdictional triggers, a status-linked nerve center rule generally provides a neutral forum 
without sacrificing simplicity and predictability. See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 94; infra notes 282–290 and 
accompanying text (discussing the objectives of simplicity and efficiency in greater detail). Specifical-
ly, in this context, the status-linked rule avoids the potential for out-of-state prejudice that may arise 
under the other principal place of business tests—such as the last business transaction approach. Com-
pare Harris v. Black Clawson Co., 961 F.2d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 1992) (characterizing the possibility 
that the last business transaction test could confer citizenship in a location where a corporation could 
not have been a citizen while active as an “odd result”), and City of Syracuse v. Loomis Armored 
U.S., LLC, No. 5:11-cv-00744, 2011 WL 6318370, at *3–4 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2011) (applying the 
last business transaction approach to a dissolved corporation even though the last transaction could 
have occurred in a place where the corporation no longer has a presence or in a place where the corpo-
ration never had a presence), with LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 10–11 (indicating that a 
corporation continues to have a presence and thus a principal place of business in the place where it is 
directing wind up and litigation activities (citing Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 292)). 
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At first glance, a status-linked nerve center rule might seem to enable a 
corporation to more easily manipulate federal court jurisdiction.275 The Hertz 
Court emphasized that courts should not permit a corporation to be a citizen of 
“a bare office with a computer, or the location of an annual executive re-
treat.”276 Indeed, a dissolved or inactive corporation’s wind up and litigation 
activities could potentially be conducted from a bare office with a computer or 
its equivalent.277 
Despite this possibility, locating a corporation’s nerve center in a bare of-
fice would not undermine Hertz if that office were in fact the corporation’s 
actual center of direction and control.278 By simply mentioning the bare office 
and executive retreat hypotheticals, the Hertz Court did not state that these 
types of locations could never be a corporation’s nerve center.279 Rather, the 
Court utilized these hypotheticals to illustrate the point that adopting a simple 
rule should not create an avenue for jurisdictional manipulation.280 In the event 
that a bare office is the site where a corporation is actually directing and con-
trolling its activities, it is consistent with Hertz to find that such a location is 
the appropriate nerve center under the circumstances.281 
                                                                                                                           
 275 Cf. Hertz, 559 U.S. at 97 (suggesting the potential for corporations to manipulatively claim 
citizenship of states pursuant to “a bare office with a computer”); id. (“[T]he courts should . . . take as 
the ‘nerve center’ the place of actual direction . . . in the absence of such manipulation.”). See general-
ly Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (2011) (arguing 
that jurisdictional rules are generally more susceptible to manipulation than policy-driven standards); 
supra notes 41–47 and accompanying text (explaining that this potential for manipulation was one of 
the driving factors for Congress’s amendment of § 1332). 
 276 559 U.S. at 97. 
 277 See Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 292; Mamco, 2011 WL 13646, at *3. 
 278 Compare Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92 (holding that the nerve center is a corporation’s “actual” loca-
tion of direction and control), with id. at 93 (explaining, without disregarding other possible locations, 
that this nerve center will “normally” be a corporation’s headquarters). See generally LanLogistics 
Petition, supra note 11, at 9–10 (arguing that a court should focus on identifying the corporation’s 
most prominent place under the circumstances); Deverell, supra note 73, at 750 (arguing that courts 
will be able to detect and prevent corporate manipulation because “[o]nly a location of direction, con-
trol, and coordination will be accepted as a true nerve center”). 
 279 See 559 U.S. at 97. So long as an unorthodox location is in fact the actual center of direction 
and control, the fact that a status-linked nerve center rule may occasionally produce this result is not 
inconsistent with Hertz. See id. at 92–93; LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 10. 
 280 See Hertz, 559 U.S. at 97; see also Deverell, supra note 73, at 750 (suggesting a court’s role in 
preventing such manipulation). 
 281 See 559 U.S. at 92, 97; see also LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 10 (arguing that a 
dissolved or inactive corporation must have a nerve center, as litigation and wind up activities will 
“always be directed and controlled from a principal place”). 
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C. Goal of Simple, Predictable Tests and Administrative Efficiency 
In addition to its consistency with the text and purpose of § 1332(c), a sta-
tus-linked nerve center is a simple rule that will produce predictable jurisdic-
tional results.282 The Hertz Court emphasized that these objectives justified 
adopting a rule that occasionally produces results that do not reflect the pur-
pose of diversity jurisdiction.283 Thus, each particular application of the nerve 
center test must aim to achieve simplicity and predictability.284  
Treating dissolution and inactivity as jurisdictional triggers avoids the 
fact-based inquiries and unpredictable results that Hertz sought to remedy 
when the Court adopted the nerve center test.285 Determining the main location 
                                                                                                                           
 282 See infra notes 283–290 and accompanying text; see also Hertz, 559 U.S. at 94–95 (emphasiz-
ing the goals of simplicity and predictability); Cent. W. Va. Energy Co. v. Mountain State Carbon, 
LLC, 636 F.3d 101, 107 (4th Cir. 2011) (explaining that the application of the nerve center test must 
be guided by the Hertz Court’s aim “to avoid resource-intensive litigation”). 
 283 559 U.S. at 95–96 (accepting the potential for anomalous results; for example, a corporation 
with its headquarters—and thus its nerve center—in New York but all of its visible activities in New 
Jersey might be subject to more out-of-state prejudice in New York courts). Importantly, both corpora-
tions and courts benefit from simplicity and predictability. Id. Corporations can more easily plan and 
assess business risks and federal courts can more quickly determine whether subject matter jurisdic-
tion exists to efficiently adjudicate a case. Id. 
 284 See id. at 94–95; see also Cent. W. Va. Energy, 636 F.3d at 107 (holding that an assessment of 
the amount of time that the officers spend directing the business from a specific location would under-
cut the intended simplicity of the nerve center test). But see Chaplin, supra note 10, at 96–97 (arguing 
that emphasizing these policies at the expense of preventing out-of-state prejudice undermines “a 
court’s obligation to do equity”). In the absence of any alternative approaches, the policies emphasized 
in Hertz might, by themselves, have justified adopting the bright line rule or the last principal place of 
business test. See 559 U.S. 95–96 (discussing the potential for anomalous results to achieve simplicity 
and predictability); Holston, 677 F.3d at 1070 (justifying the bright line rule on policy grounds). Be-
cause these approaches are inconsistent with the Hertz holding, however, the status-linked nerve cen-
ter test is superior because it both furthers the goals of simplicity and predictability and is consistent 
with Hertz. Compare Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92–93 (holding that the principal place of business must be a 
corporation’s nerve center, i.e., “the actual center of direction, control, and coordination”), with supra 
notes 193–234 and accompanying text (illustrating how the alternative approaches to determining the 
principal place of business for a dissolved or inactive corporation are inconsistent with Hertz), supra 
notes 270–281 and accompanying text (illustrating how the status-linked rule is consistent with the 
focus of Hertz), and infra notes 285–290 and accompanying text (illustrating how the status-linked 
rule promotes simplicity and predictability). 
 285 See 559 U.S. at 93–94; cf. Jonathan R. Nash, Instrument Choice in Federal Court Jurisdiction: 
Rules, Standards, and Discretion 33–34 (Emory Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Re-
search Paper Series, Paper No. 10-92, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1553584, archived at http://perma.cc/PPC8-ZSF7 (arguing that jurisdictional rules are 
more efficient and predictable than standards, as ambiguities in standards encourage litigation). Recall 
that prior to Hertz, the outcome of the principal place business analysis was unpredictable both be-
cause federal courts applied a variety of approaches and because many of these approaches involved 
complex fact-based inquiries. See, e.g., Ferrell v. Express Check Advance of SC, LLC, 591 F.3d 698, 
706 (4th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a corporation’s structure and activities dictate whether to apply the 
nerve center test or the place of operations test); Teal Energy USA, Inc. v. GT, Inc., 369 F.3d 873, 877 
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from which a dissolved or inactive corporation directs litigation and wind up 
activities will be no more complex than locating the nerve center of an active 
corporation.286 The Hertz Court indicated that, if possible, a corporation’s 
nerve center should be identified based on objectively determinable criteria, 
such as the location of its headquarters.287 It follows that in the context of dis-
solved and inactive corporations, the nerve center should be determined based 
on similarly objective indicia.288 Moreover, equating a dissolved corporation’s 
nerve center with such a location would provide predictability for corporations, 
allowing them to quickly identify their nerve center as the place from which 
they are directing litigation.289 Therefore, the status-linked nerve center ap-
proach will establish a simple and predictable principal place of business de-
termination for dissolved and inactive corporations.290 
CONCLUSION 
After the Supreme Court’s 2010 decision Hertz Corp. v. Friend, a corpo-
ration’s principal business is its nerve center—its “center of direction, control, 
and coordination.” When the nerve center test is applied to a dissolved or inac-
tive corporation, a conclusion that the corporation does not have a nerve center 
or that it retains its most recent nerve center confers improper significance on a 
corporation’s active status. Consequently, an inactive or dissolved corporation 
will either not have a principal place of business under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1), 
or its principal place of business will reflect a past center of control, rather than 
the current location of its control functions. Each of these results is incon-
sistent with both the diversity statute and the holding and reasoning in Hertz. 
                                                                                                                           
(5th Cir. 2004) (considering all of the facts and circumstances and concluding that the principal place 
of business was the location of the corporation’s executive offices because its activities were not “far-
flung”); Indus. Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying the place 
of operations test, rather than the nerve center test, because a majority of the corporation’s business 
was located in one state).  
 286 See LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 10 (observing that litigation and wind up activities 
“will always be directed and controlled from a principal place”); see also Hertz, 559 U.S. at 92–93 
(explaining that the “actual” center of direction and control will generally be a corporation’s headquar-
ters). 
 287 See 559 U.S. at 92–93. 
 288 See id.; LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 10. 
 289 See Athena Auto., 166 F.3d at 292; LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 10 (observing that 
litigation activities will always be directed from a main location); see also Cent. W. Va. Energy, 636 
F.3d at 107 (suggesting that when applying the nerve center test, courts should avoid needlessly fact-
based assessments of time spent on direction and control). 
 290 See LanLogistics Petition, supra note 11, at 10; see also Hertz, 559 U.S. at 94–95 (emphasiz-
ing the goals of simplicity and predictability); Nash, supra note 285, at 34 (arguing that jurisdictional 
rules are less ambiguous than standards and thus produce more predictable results). 
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A status-linked nerve center test should govern the principal place of 
business determination. A dissolved or inactive corporation will often have its 
nerve center in the location where the corporation is closing down its business 
and directing litigation. This approach will allow a court to find a principal 
place of business for all corporations and thus meet the dual citizenship re-
quirement for diversity jurisdiction. Unlike other approaches applied to dis-
solved and inactive corporations, a status-linked nerve center test reflects a 
corporation’s true center of control that is both simple for courts to apply and 
predictable for corporations to anticipate. Because this approach is consistent 
with both § 1332 and the Hertz Court’s nerve center test, courts should apply 
this approach when determining an atypical corporation’s principal place of 
business. 
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